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Heuristic:  Law and Economics and
the Debate over Physician-
Assisted Suicide**
Everybody dies.  But if death is like taxation in being inevita-ble, it is also like taxation in that its most vexing questions
are about how and when, rather than whether, it will occur.
Nowadays, most people die in hospitals;1 most people die of
chronic illness;2 and most people are subject to medical interven-
tion that may postpone the time and alter the manner of their
deaths.3  Not all such alteration is inevitably seen as salutary.
Many terminally ill patients suffer, and they may see various
medical interventions as prolonging, or even intensifying, that
suffering.  That such perceptions are commonplace has given rise
to ample public concern about the role of the medical profession
in alleviating the suffering of the dying and, incidentally, a vast
body of literature on death and dying.  Two of the most striking
issues presented by the medicalization of death are those sur-
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1 See  2A NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, tbl. 1-30, at
374-79 (1996) (reporting places of death in the U.S. for 1992), available at  http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/mort92_2a.pdf .
2 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES:  1997, at 97 (1997) (representing deaths by age and leading cause for 1994),
available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/97statab/vitstat.pdf.
3 See Louis Lasagna, The Prognosis of Death , in THE DYING PATIENT 67, 68
(Orville G. Brim, Jr. et al. eds., 1970).
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rounding the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and physician-
assisted suicide (PAS).
Attempts to establish a constitutional right to PAS on due pro-
cess and equal protection grounds were repudiated by the Su-
preme Court in the last decade, casting the debate back to the
states.4  There the debate over PAS continues apace.  Recently,
for example, former United States Attorney General John Ash-
croft argued that Oregon physicians practicing PAS pursuant to
Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act” are in violation of the fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act.5  In May 2004, a divided panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the Attorney General’s position as unenforceable.6  That deci-
sion now goes before the United States Supreme Court.7
Although the literature addressing medical decisions at the
end of life is vast, surprisingly little of that commentary has come
from the perspective of law and economics.  That is odd, both
because of the large body of economic literature regarding health
care generally and because of the stark costs and benefits en-
tailed by any legal constraints on medical decisions at the end of
life.8  At stake are, on the one hand, questions of individual au-
tonomy with respect to some of life’s most desperate and per-
sonal decisions and, on the other hand, some of our most
universal and well-entrenched norms prohibiting the willful tak-
ing of human life, norms that surely represent at least useful
heuristics for maximizing social welfare.9
4 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997).
5 See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2004).
6 Id.  at 1131.
7 The granting of certiorari for what is now Gonzales v. Oregon  is at 125 S. Ct.
1299 (Feb. 22, 2005) (No. 04-623).  The Court’s docket is reported at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-623.htm.
8 See, e.g. , Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care , 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (early discussion of economics and health
care).
9 At least, but not at most.  Such norms may be viewed variously, both with regard
to their etiology and with regard to their generality.  For example, on a Kantian
scheme we might see them as necessary and exceptionless rules for rational human
conduct. See, e.g. , IMMANUEL KANT, KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., London 1948) (outlining Kant’s moral theory).
Nothing in the argument that follows depends on a very particular account of social
or moral norms.  How one counts norms here may be up for grabs as well.  I’m
considering at least two:  the general norm against intentionally taking the life of
another (save, perhaps, in self-defense or in wartime) and the more specific norm
prevalent in the medical profession against a doctor’s participation in PAS.
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Not all is silence, however.  Notably, Judge Richard Posner has
offered a sort of cost-benefit analysis favoring the legalization of
PAS.10  Despite Posner’s signal position of influence as a jurist
and a scholar, his discussion has been substantially ignored in the
ongoing PAS debate.11  This is in some respects understandable.
For one thing, Posner’s critique of the extant policy literature
tends to be broad but quick.  In places, his analysis of topics al-
ready the loci of much debate may appear exceedingly casual.12
But at bottom, I believe that Posner’s discussion is often over-
looked because of a mistake about the type of economic—or
law-and-economic—explanation he has on offer.  On its face,
Posner’s discussion seems to offer a broad—albeit not compre-
hensive—canvas of the various costs and benefits that the adop-
tion of a particular legal regime permissive of PAS would, or
should, entail.  The ensuing social welfare calculus considers truly
diverse phenomena in turn, without the benefit of a developed
pragmatic means of limiting the cost-benefit problem space.
I believe that Posner has something more in mind.  At the
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995) (concentrating on the is-
sue, especially in Chapter 10, Euthanasia and Geronticide).  Posner talks about bal-
ancing costs and benefits in the most general sense appropriate to social welfare
analysis; that is, abstracting from particular methodological commitments that come
with particular approaches to cost-benefit analysis as practiced in the agencies, he is
interested in the most basic of economic questions we can ask of any policy:  what
will it get us and at what cost?
Of course, to argue the benefits of legalized PAS via costs and benefits might seem
worse than a bad joke.  It has often been observed that medical expenditures at the
end of life are substantial, even as the economic implications of those expenditures
have been found by many to be unclear. See, e.g. , Seanda Coppa, Futile Care:  Con-
fronting the High Costs of Dying , 26 J. NURSING ADMIN. 18 (1996) (discussing the
great monetary costs of “futile care for the dying”). But cf.  Helene Levens Lipton,
Medical Care in the Last Year of Life:  A Review of Economic and Social Issues , 1
COMPREHENSIVE GERONTOLOGY 89 (1987) (arguing that conclusions regarding
overconsumption of medical care at the end of life may be at least premature).  That
it is likely cheaper to kill people than keep them alive—however one cabins the
domain of terminally ill candidates for PAS—appears at once obvious and imperti-
nent.  But however obvious that  calculus, it is not what Posner has in mind.  On the
other hand, this balance is not irrelevant to Posner’s larger attempt at calculation.
See POSNER, supra , at 244 (suggesting that the cost of keeping terminal patients
alive is—to the extent borne by the public—a legitimate third-party cost in the
larger analysis, although a cost made tentative by the question whether (and, pre-
sumably, to what extent) legalization of PAS might tend to promote or suppress the
frequency of suicide).
11 For a recent example of the debate in the courts, see Oregon v. Ashcroft , 368
F.3d 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 I shall argue some of these limitations below, although I am mostly concerned
to discuss the model that seems to me to be at the heart of Posner’s discussion.
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heart of his account is a model of PAS legalization as a sort of
technological innovation.  What this particular innovation brings
is a radical reduction in certain critical information costs attend-
ing end-of-life decision making.  In brief, the promise of assisted
suicide is said to provide a wait-and-see window for desperate
decision-makers, a window in which critical uncertainties are
likely to be resolved.  To the extent that the information costs
imposed by such uncertainties are the crux of the problem, the
innovation represents a real breakthrough.  More generally, Pos-
ner’s is an account according to which a single, relatively simple
economic aspect of some change in legal regime is held to be
clear, univocal, and dominant.  Posner’s model of PAS thus
looks—at least implicitly—to constitute a sort of end run around
the messy business of assessing the very disparate costs and bene-
fits many think to be implicated in the PAS debate.  In brief, Pos-
ner thinks little of the oft-discussed social costs of PAS, so he
does not need to count them against the benefits he anticipates;
these are, that legalized PAS may: (a) reduce the absolute num-
ber of suicides; (b) reduce (costly) uncertainty and anxiety re-
garding contemplated suicides; (c) improve the self-selection of
suicides; and (d) reduce the costs entailed by those suicides that
are carried out.
Posner’s discussion is worth attention for several reasons.  For
one thing, Posner may be right that “the opponents of physician-
assisted suicide underestimate the benefits and exaggerate the
costs.”13  Moreover, Posner’s focus on information and uncer-
tainty are well placed, as questions regarding decision-making
under uncertainty are central in end-of-life care generally.  Pos-
ner’s model—for all its limitations—does not obscure these is-
sues; it helps to make them clear.  More interesting still, I think,
is the promise implicit in some of the conceptual tools Posner
brings to bear on PAS, a promise only partly fulfilled in Posner’s
own discussion.
In this Article, I want to take up three issues raised by Posner’s
discussion.  First, I want to consider Posner’s model of one partic-
ular legalization scheme seen as a sort of technological innova-
tion.  That model frames, in a useful way, some of the central
problems posed by consideration of PAS as a case of decision-
making under conditions of radical uncertainty (for the individ-
ual at one level and for the state at another).  I argue that Pos-
13 POSNER, supra  note 10, at 243. R
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ner’s model is incomplete.  The problem is not that the
information gains suggested by Posner’s model are ephemeral.
Rather, it is that for typical patients they are too small, and too
incrementally realized, to make a critical difference.  Legaliza-
tion of PAS is not likely to remove the fundamental uncertainties
attending end-of-life decision-making and it is not likely to pro-
vide benefits adequate to offset the myriad costs considered in
the familiar policy debate.  Recasting the model, I argue that cer-
tain biases implicit in such decision making suggest an answer
rather different from the one Posner advocates; that is, I have in
mind an argument on behalf of what is, in almost all the states,
the status quo.14
Second, I want to consider generally the question of applying
some sort of bounded cost-benefit analysis to the deeply frag-
mented policy debate over PAS.  I shall argue that a general solu-
tion to the problems posed by PAS is not forthcoming via cost-
benefit analysis.  Considering such analysis is useful, all the same,
when applied to implementation-level problems within the PAS
debate.15
Third, I want to discuss the normative framework within which
the PAS debate does or ought to occur.  That is, I want to con-
sider the baseline assumptions against which we should evaluate
arguments for redrawing the legal rules regarding PAS.  To do so
involves answering questions about both the substantive and epi-
stemic standards requisite for certain sorts of legal norm reform.
It will also raise a question about the default standards that
should govern when the project of justifying a change in the sta-
tus quo proves intractable.
Writ large, the point of this Article is to consider, on the one
hand, some of the light economic analysis may shed on the PAS
14 Prohibition of PAS takes different forms in the states.  Famously, Vacco v.
Quill , 521 U.S. 793 (1997), one of the two simultaneously decided Supreme Court
cases repudiating claims to a Constitutional right to PAS, began with a challenge to
New York State’s explicit criminal prohibition of PAS, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3)
(McKinney 1987).  To date, only Oregon has enacted a statute permitting PAS; that
is, Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act.” OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2003).
15 Although the general notion of implementation may be ubiquitous in the law—
consider, for example, the notion of a statute’s implementing regulations—the theo-
retical topic of implementation has received little attention here.  A general discus-
sion of this topic would take us far from the subject of this Article.  I refer, however,
to the developed cognitive science literature on levels or hierarchies of explanation
of complex systems for the sense of “implementation” I am after. See, e.g. , DAVID
MARR, VISION (1982); Daniel Gilman, Optimization and Simplicity:  Computational
Vision and Biological Explanation , 107 SYNTHESE 293 (1996).
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debate and, on the other, certain aspects of the debate that may
not prove amenable to economic solution.  At a lower level I
seek to do two things, apart from simple reconsideration of Pos-
ner’s extant text.  First, I mean to develop an argument against
legalization of PAS that is not predicated on the general notion
that suicide, assisted or otherwise, should be viewed as anath-
ema.  There are serious general arguments against suicide, just as
there are serious general arguments for its decriminalization.16  It
will not be part of this Article to reject those arguments.  I am,
simply, arguing to a particular conclusion based on more broadly
acceptable premises; and those are that we should be extremely
chary of state-sponsored killing.  At the very least we ought in
several respects to set the bar high when considering putative jus-
tifications for enlarging the scope of permissible killing beyond
the established cases of defense, self-defense, and certain limited
law enforcement contexts.  In particular, we ought very carefully
to scrutinize arguments on behalf of PAS predicated on the sup-
posed consent of those who are to be killed.
Second, my argument against legalization will both depend on
and inform aspects of the debates over commensurability and
risk analysis.  Special concerns about interpersonal valuations of
life will lead to special concerns about how to evaluate the inevi-
table error rate that would be associated with any of the offered
screening filters for PAS.  In turn, the sorts of problems
presented by decisions at the end of life may suggest an espe-
cially bad case—perhaps generalizable—about the familiar prox-
ies offered to ground interpersonal valuations of life in the larger
risk management debate.
The course of my discussion is as follows: Section I offers a
critical analysis of Posner’s general overview of the PAS policy
and ethics literature.  Elements of that discussion surface later in
the Article, but it is not critical to understanding Posner’s formal
model of his legalization scheme, and readers chiefly interested
16 See, e.g. , PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 128-29, 140-47 (1979) (arguing that
assisted suicide and “voluntary active euthanasia” are morally permissible under
certain circumstances); James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia , 292 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 78, 78-80 (1975) (criticizing the familiar distinction between active and
passive euthanasia and arguing that active euthanasia may sometimes be morally
preferable to passive euthanasia). But see , e.g. , Daniel Callahan, When Self-Deter-
mination Runs Amok , HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 52, 52-55 (against
euthanasia generally); Thomas D. Sullivan, Active and Passive Euthanasia:  An Im-
pertinent Distinction? , 3 HUM. LIFE REV. 40 (1977) (defending the “traditional posi-
tion” on euthanasia and criticizing Rachels).
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in that scheme may wish to skip to section II.  Section II consid-
ers Posner’s model of a proposed change in legal regime with
respect to PAS and his analysis of that model.  The model is
found problematic in various regards.  Because the benefits to
PAS modeled by Posner do not dominate the costs familiar from
the literature, we are left with the question of how to account for
those costs in a systematic fashion.  I consider one family of such
costs, those entailed by informed consent requirements generally
and by ineffective or mistaken consents in particular.  Posner ap-
pears to suppose that the problem of devising institutional struc-
tures to guarantee effective consent is trivial.  I do not think any
such thing, and Section III discusses certain biomedical impedi-
ments to consent (and to ascertaining consent) among the termi-
nally-ill elderly, raising a question about inevitable error rates for
any contemplated screening procedure for PAS (including the
abridged procedure offered by Posner).  Section IV then consid-
ers how to figure a cost for such errors in light of the risk man-
agement literature regarding the valuation of human lives.
Despite the positive literature regarding risk management, the
project is found to be very likely intractable.  Section IV also
considers other special categories of third-party costs that might
be entailed by the legalization of PAS.  Finally, I conclude by of-
fering a positive account of why difficulties in completing a social
welfare analysis of PAS ought to leave us with something other
than just a puzzle.  Considering the general (heuristic) utility of
certain moral norms, together with the degree to which such
norms tend to be embedded and the consequent costs of attempt-
ing their modification by legal fiat, it is argued that what is gener-
ally the legal status quo should be regarded as a strong default
position at the least.
I
THE (SELECTED) COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PAS
Posner’s analysis comes in two parts.  First, he proposes a bal-
ancing of costs and benefits meant to favor the legalization of
PAS.  Second, he offers a quasi-formal, quasi-empirical argument
on behalf of the suggestion that legalization of PAS may actually
serve to decrease the incidence of PAS.  The first analysis is
framed by a particular utilitarian commitment as well as a stipu-
lated restriction on the domain of discourse.  That is, Posner—
following John Stuart Mill—will count only “tangible harms” to
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third parties as third-party costs.17  As well, Posner’s argument is
to apply only to “physician-assisted suicide in cases of severely
disabling and debilitating, usually though not always terminal,
illness.”18
Within this framework, Posner considers five factors: (1) the
extent to which suicides may be impulsive;19 (2) the option value
of a legal right to PAS;20 (3) the competing (third-party?) wishes
of family members;21 (4) emotional or psychological illness as
distorting patient volition;22 and (5) the putative social harms en-
tailed by blurring the mission of physicians.23
I will begin with the second factor, as Posner’s argument here
makes a straightforward and worthwhile economic point.24  Pos-
ner suggests that the right to PAS has a sort of option value for
seriously ill patients, whether they choose to exercise the right or
not.25  I think that this is correct as far as it goes.  That is, I think
it likely that there is a non-trivial class of patients who would
derive some positive utility if U.S. law (or the law of their partic-
ular jurisdictions) were to provide legal access to PAS.  And I
think it psychologically plausible that some patients would enjoy
such a “right” independent of any choice to exercise it.  Reports
from Oregon seem to indicate that there are at least some pa-
tients who appreciate the “option value” of the form of PAS
available under law there.26  Thus, I think Posner is right to sug-
gest that legalization of PAS would provide some positive option
value that: (a) ought to be considered in any complete tally of
costs and benefits for PAS; and (b) ought to some non-zero ex-
17 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 238.  This is both a defensible and problematic R
restriction.  For now, we’ll note that, however broad the support for utilitarian the-
ory more generally, this is but one possible version of utilitarian accounting.  Below,
we’ll consider how well or poorly Posner cabins “tangible” from intangible third-
party harms. See infra  Part IV.B.
18 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 237-38. R
19 See id.  at 238.
20 See id.  at 239-40.
21 See id.  at 240.
22 See id.
23 See id.  at 241-43.
24 I leave aside the third argument altogether as it seems insubstantial at best.
25 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 239. R
26 See  Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians’ Experiences with the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act , 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557 (2000) (surveying Oregon doctors regarding
the practice of PAS, and regarding their own observations of patient reports); Susan
Okie, ‘I Should Die the Way I Want To’:  Ore. Doctors, Patients Defend Threatened
Assisted Suicide Law , WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2002, at A1, A6 (reporting interviews
with several Oregon physicians and patients).
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tent offset any costs legalization would impose.27  But that is as
far as Posner takes it.  There is no attempt to specify the scope of
the class of patients for whom some substantial option value
might obtain.  And no case is made—à la  cost-benefit analysis in
the agencies—for some particular assignment of interpersonal
value to that option for that class.  Thus, although Posner has
raised an issue worth consideration, he has not begun to answer
the question of how much this limited option value might offset
any costs at issue.
Next, I will take factors one and four together, as they overlap
in Posner’s analysis as well as my own.  According to Posner:
[t]he main nonreligious objection to generally  making suicide
easier than it is . . . is that many suicides are impulsive, the
product of a bout of depression, intense grief or shame, bad
news that may be wrong . . . or other transient causes that, ex
ante, the affected individual might want to prevent from af-
fecting him.  Efforts to discourage such suicides, as by making
them more costly by punishing people who assist in them, can
be loosely analogized to the prohibition of extortion . . . in
which a class of transactions yielding a short-term gain . . . is
denied legal sanction because the vast majority of people
would consider themselves better off if the occasion for such a
transaction never arose.28
Posner, here, appears to signal a complex of concerns about
competence and consent, uncertainty, and the stability of prefer-
ences underlying choices to commit suicide.  What’s useful is the
straightforward observation—oft ignored in analyses not
grounded in economic concepts—that legal sanction, however
stringent, imposes a cost on a given form of conduct, a cost that
has predictable effects on consumption of that conduct and sub-
stitutes for that conduct.29  Few sanctions are so stringent as to
drive consumption to zero.30
In addition, the focus on the putatively transient nature of ex-
pressed preferences for PAS brings together both: (a) concerns
27 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 239-40. R
28 See id.  at 238.
29 Of course, this observation has been made elsewhere, not least by Posner him-
self. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1992); see also
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis in Criminal Law , 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 344-45 (2004); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty , 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997).
30 Murder rates do not tend to be null in the face of even the harshest penalties.
And trivially, few legal rights come with such lavish subsidies as to impose zero costs
on consumers of the behaviors those rights guarantee.
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about the stability of expressed preferences under conditions of
cognitive and affective impairment; and (b) concerns about the
relationship between expressed preferences in the strained and
unusual domain of PAS (and end-of-life decision-making gener-
ally) and the causal reach of any sort of stable underlying prefer-
ence function that is to provide a foundation for such expressed
preferences.
What is striking about Posner’s response to these concerns is
that it consists of two wholly analytic arguments.  There is no em-
pirical ground, no attempt to assess and balance actual costs and
benefits.  The first pass is brief: “A prohibition against assisting
suicide cannot be persuasively defended on this ground in cases
in which the person who wants to end his life is incapable of do-
ing so.  The condition that makes it infeasible for the individual
to take his own life furnishes a rational motivation for suicide.”31
Indeed, that may be correct.  At the same time, the mere possi-
bility that some level of serious physical incapacity might, for
some persons, under some circumstances, constitute some part of
the basis of a rational choice to commit suicide tells us rather
little.  Posner elaborates on this argument by considering the
plaintiffs in Compassion in Dying v. Washington , the trial court
case that gave rise to Washington v. Glucksberg .32  There, as he
says, the court’s description of the plaintiffs—that is, those of the
plaintiffs suffering from terminal illness—is indeed “harrow-
ing.”33  And perhaps Posner is right that “[i]t is easy to see that
an individual who is soon to die anyway . . . may have a negative
expected utility of living.”34  But that such a negative assessment
31 POSNER, supra  note 10, at 238. R
32 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Glucksberg  is, of course, the companion case to Vacco v.
Quill .  521 U.S. 793 (1997). Glucksberg and Quill , famously, were decided unani-
mously by the Court on the same day in 1997.  Together, the cases firmly and unani-
mously reject a constitutional right to access to PAS.  In Glucksberg , action
commenced when three anonymous terminal patients, five physicians, and the non-
profit organization Compassion in Dying, brought suit challenging the constitutional
permissibility of a Washington State statute banning PAS.  We may, of course, ac-
knowledge the plight of those anonymous patients without acceding to their legal
brief.
33 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 239. R
34 See id.  A recent interview with Judge Posner may be instructive here.  Reflect-
ing on his father’s last years, Judge Posner is quoted as saying
[b]ecause my father was more or less compos mentis and wanted treat-
ment, you couldn’t deny it. . . . [T]he notion of giving up, not fighting to the
end, was anathema to him.  I hope my generation can be a little more ra-
tional about this.  I’d like to choose my own time of exit.
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is possible does not make it—to any particular degree—likely,
much less necessary.  And even in the face of a negative expected
utility, assessed in the face of extreme suffering, a patient might
rationally prefer any number of substitutes to PAS.  For one
thing, the patient might simply prefer adequate pain medication,
a generally feasible and entirely lawful alternative, which unfor-
tunately many terminal patients are denied.35
What then, is there, beyond the claim that it is not merely ana-
lytic that a request for PAS is pathological?  Regarding emo-
tional and cognitive disorders among the terminal elderly, Posner
argues that:
Anyone who decides to kill himself must find his life depress-
ing, and, with “suicidal ideation” and the like used to diagnose
depression, it is apparent that one would have to assume that
suicide is irrational in order to be justified in declaring a sui-
cide irrational because  the person who committed suicide was
depressed.  The argument is circular.36
Indeed, that  argument is circular.  And that argument does ex-
ist in the literature, and does reflect an ongoing tendency on the
part of some mental health professionals to see the contempla-
tion of suicide as itself psychological pathology.37  But if that ar-
gument is something more than a straw man, it is something
rather less than the typical concern about depression and voli-
tion.  In brief, it does not reflect the dominant contemporary
view of depression and suicide and it is not the typical argument.
Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner , NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78, 83.
35 See generally  Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Good Care of the
Dying Patient , 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 474, 475 (1996) (noting that in hospice care
only two percent of dying patients suffer pain that is difficult for the treatment team
to manage); Robert McCann et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill Patients:  The
Appropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration , 272 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1263, 1263-65
(1994) (monitoring thirty-two consecutively admitted, terminally-ill patients in a
comfort care setting, none of whom reported “much discomfort”; especially striking
indications of the potential of palliative care were that, of the patients reporting
“some discomfort,” two suffered from metastases of cancer to bone and liver, one
was an eighty-three year-old woman with lung cancer and chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease, and one began his stay with significant bony pain from multiple
myloma).  Cf.  Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and its Treatment in Outpatients with
Metastatic Cancer , 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592 (1994) (reporting that forty-two per-
cent of its sample of 597 cancer patients were not given adequate analgesic therapy).
36 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 240. R
37 See, e.g. , Linda Ganzini et al., Evaluation of Competence to Consent to Assisted
Suicide:  Views of Forensic Psychiatrists , 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 595, 595 (2000)
(reporting the results of a survey of 456 board-certified forensic psychiatrists).  Pos-
ner cites Thomas J. Marzen, “Out, Out Brief Candle”:  Constitutionally Prescribed
Suicide for the Terminally Ill , 21 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 799 (1994).
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It is generally true that “suicidal ideation” is used to diagnose
depression.  It is not generally true that suicidal ideation is itself
a mood disorder or that it is sufficient, as a symptom, to justify
diagnosis of a mood disorder.38  For example, the American Psy-
chiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) lists suicidal ideation as but one of
nine criteria for a Major Depressive Episode.39  And the DSM-
IV requires that five or more of the nine symptoms be present
during a given two-week period for a positive diagnosis.40
That is not to say that suicidal ideation is not legitimate
grounds for therapeutic concern.  Of course it is.  But the general
psychiatric concern with suicidal patients is more complex than is
captured in Posner’s argument and does not logically preclude a
rational choice to seek PAS.  Posner’s circle is not closed, much
less vicious.
It is surprising that Posner’s treatment of emotional and cogni-
tive disorders among elderly terminal patients is so superficial.
Much of Posner’s “theory” of old age can be read as a morbid
meditation on the worst forms of decline that old age may have
to offer.41  Indeed, Posner himself recognizes—then glosses
over—the issue in his chapter on euthanasia and geronticide.42
But despite his substantial preoccupation with the cognitive and
emotional impairment that aging may bring, Posner does not
seem interested in the question whether legalization of PAS will
in fact offer a bona fide option for many patients who are not
well placed to engage in the ordinary life practice of choosing,
much less that of choosing between possible “arm’s length”
transactions with doctors who are their caregivers and, not inci-
dentally, state-appointed gatekeepers to regulated narcotic
painkillers.43
38 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 317-444 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (reviewing various classes
of mood disorders and anxiety disorders); see also Ganzini et al., supra  note 37, at R
595-96.
39 See DSM-IV, supra  note 38, at 327. R
40 See id.
41 “Aging is most usefully viewed as a process one element of which is an inexora-
ble decline across a broad range of bodily (including both physical and mental) capa-
bilities:  call this ‘bodily decline.’” See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 18.
42 See id . at 236.
43 And, at least in the case of Medicare patients, gatekeepers to hospice care, as
coverage depends on the attending physician’s certification that the patient is both
terminal and likely to die within six months. See, e.g. , CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, YOUR MEDI-
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In fact, there is a complex relationship between pain, depres-
sion, and requests for PAS.  For example, it has been observed
that under-medication of pain symptoms can promote or aggra-
vate depression in the terminal elderly, and can otherwise
prompt requests for PAS, requests that often disappear in the
face of adequate pain medication.44  And several authors have
expressed special concern about the relationship between de-
pression and PAS in women patients.45  For example, Lynn Kohm
and Britney Brigner have observed that women are twice as
likely as men to suffer from major depression, and that such de-
pression, and its underlying causes, make women more likely
both to request PAS and to acquiesce to external pressures to
seek PAS.46
Especially troubling is the observation that “[w]hile far fewer
women than men kill themselves, three times as many women as
men try to kill themselves.”47  To the extent that this disparity
reflects a large number of women trying not to end their lives but
to seek help,48 we ought to be concerned that legalized PAS
might well lower an important threshold for emotionally troub-
led women who are not beyond psychological assistance and
whose lives might otherwise be significantly extended in ways
valuable to themselves and others. The case for PAS as an alter-
native to irremediable suffering might appear compelling,49 but
the case for PAS as a low-cost substitute for adequate psychiatric
treatment does not.50
CARE BENEFITS 28 (revised July 2004), at  http://www.medicare. gov/Publications/
Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf.
44 See BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS 280 (1997).
45 See, e.g. , Lynne Marie Kohm & Britney N. Brigner, Women and Assisted Sui-
cide:  Exposing the Gender Vulnerability to Acquiescent Death,  4 CARDOZO WO-
MEN’S L.J. 241 (1998).
46 See id.  at 260-64.
47 See id.  at 268 (quoting Bard Lindeman, Deal with Suicide Realities, But Discard
the Myths , RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Apr. 11, 1996, at H6).
48 See Kohm & Brigner, supra  note 45, at 241-42.
49 See, e.g. , Brief for Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-
1858).
50 Of course, that is not a logically impossible argument.  Part of a cost-benefit
analysis of PAS must be an analysis of substitution effects that ought to attend vari-
ous policy options.  And things get thorny when one contemplates these costs
through the lens of Medicare and Medicaid subsidies.  Where PAS comes cheap and
psychiatric treatment—at least for a certain class of patients—comes dear, PAS
might look that much more attractive as a substitute locus of public subsidy.  But
that is surely an unhappy argument.  As far as I know, it has not been advanced by
any contemporary proponent of PAS.
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This is, of course, a telegraphic discussion of the thorny
problems of depression among the terminal patients Posner ad-
dresses.  I am not arguing that such cases of depression exhaust
the domain.  I am not arguing that all cases of depression or any
other form of suffering can be adequately treated, much less that
they all necessarily obviate the possibility of rational choice.  I
am not arguing that there are no rational exercises of genuine
volition in requesting PAS.  I am suggesting: (1) that our ordinary
assumptions about the stability of preferences and the autonomy
of choice are, as matters of empirical fact, complicated when we
consider depression among elderly medical patients suffering
some terminal disease; (2) that these complications raise serious
concerns for any analysis of costs and benefits of the legalization
of PAS;51 and (3) that Posner’s argument about depression can-
not possibly settle the matter.  In Section III, below, I shall more
thoroughly examine the problem of consent with regard to cogni-
tive—rather than affective—disorders among terminally-ill eld-
erly medical patients.  That will serve both to push Posner’s
analysis further into the red and to illustrate just one of the kinds
of independent empirical analyses that need to underlie this sort
of economic discussion.
Before turning to Posner’s model of legalization as a sort of
technological innovation, I should briefly consider Posner’s dis-
cussion of medical norms and his argument that concerns about
confounding the role of the physician via change in legal regime
are misplaced.52  Here, he makes a conceptual point and an em-
pirical one.  In the first case, he argues that tolerating the specta-
cle of ghastly pain can also create ambivalence about healing.53
Thus, presumably, PAS prohibitions may blur the mission, con-
found the psychology, and create competing pressures on the
reputational assets of physicians as easily as would their repeal.
Second, he suggests that the Dutch experience with euthanasia,
from the 1970s through much of the 1990s, under conditions of
51 For example, these complications include those about the sort of institutional
arrangements that might mitigate fears of involuntary—or at least nonvoluntary—
euthanasia.  One large scale survey revealed that most forensic psychologists are not
confident that they could—in the course of a single examination—determine
whether depression or cognitive deficit were responsible for a patient request for
PAS. See Ganzini et al., supra  note 37, at 595 (reporting that fifty-one percent were R
“not at all confident” they could make the diagnosis; forty-three percent were only
“somewhat confident”; and only six percent were “very confident”).
52 POSNER, supra  note 10, at 241. R
53 Id .
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relatively light legal prohibition and weak enforcement, signals
that more widespread practice of PAS in the United States would
not lead to any sort of general decline in respect for life, either
within the medical profession or without.  To that end, Posner
takes issue with one of the chief, then-current, English-language
sources alleging that PAS is not always performed with patient
consent in the Netherlands.54
A detailed sociological assessment of the Dutch experience
with PAS will not be found in Posner’s discussion and I do not
mean to offer a substitute here; it is beyond both the scope of this
Article and my own expertise.  But because the specter of Dutch
euthanasia looms so large in the greater policy debate, I should
raise a few points on the way to bracketing this discussion.  First,
Posner’s critique of Carlos Gomez’s account of euthanasia in the
Netherlands is at least contentious, and is based on no indepen-
dent empirical ground.55  Second—more important and perhaps
no surprise here—the character and effects of Dutch practice of
PAS remain a source of controversy, as have reports of numerous
instances of non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands;56 cer-
tainly, and at least, the intervening years have not rendered the
international medical community sanguine about PAS in the
Netherlands.  Third, as others have observed, observations drawn
from a small, ethnically homogeneous nation—one with vastly
different norms and market conditions surrounding medical
practice—may be of limited value in generating predictions
about U.S. medical practice.57  Fourth, the period of Dutch prac-
54 See id.  (critiquing CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH (1991)).
55 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear , 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1143-44
(2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
56 See, e.g. , Raphael Cohen-Almagor, An Outsider’s View of Dutch Euthanasia
Policy and Practice , 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 35 (2001); Richard Fenigsen, The Report
of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia , 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 339
(1991); Herbert Hendin et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Netherlands:  Lessons from the Dutch , 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1720 (1997);  John
Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands:  Sliding Down the Slippery Slope? , in EU-
THANASIA EXAMINED:  ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 261 (John
Keown ed. 1995); Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., Consultants in Cases of In-
tended Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands , 170 MED. J. AUSTRALIA
360, 360-63 (1999); Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life-terminating Acts Without Explicit
Request of Patient , 341 LANCET 1196, 1197 (1993). But see  Jocelyn Downie, The
Contested Lessons of Euthanasia in the Netherlands , 8 HEALTH L.J. 119 (2000) (ar-
guing not that Dutch practice is unproblematic, but that many reports on Dutch PAS
are significantly flawed).
57 See, e.g. , Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide:  Will
Lightning Strike Thrice? , 35 DUQ. L. REV. 159, 172-73 (1996) (discussing doctors’
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tice Posner considers does not quite mirror his contemplated le-
gal change in any case; the Netherlands has only very recently
decriminalized PAS (under certain conditions), so whatever we
make of Posner’s quarrel with Gomez, we might well reserve
judgment on what legalization holds even within the
Netherlands.
Observations from Oregon might further support Posner’s
claim against a slippery slope.  Certainly wholesale adoption of
PAS by the medical community has not occurred in Oregon.58
Surveys of physician practice indicate that most patient requests
for PAS are rejected.59  Indeed, several large medical centers and
about one-third of Oregon physicians reject the practice of PAS
outright, on religious, moral, or philosophical grounds.60
At least the most pessimistic predictions about PAS have not
come to fruition.  But we do not yet know much about Oregon
itself, after a few short years of legal sanction for one form of
PAS.  Apart from the questions whether and to what extent Ore-
gon may be a useful model for those considering PAS for the rest
of the United States, we might well wonder about the relevant
time scale at which to evaluate Oregon practice.  Given wide-
spread entrenchment of social norms generally, and physician
norms in particular, a few years period of observation is likely far
too brief.61  Deeply entrenched mores do not tend to shift so
quickly in the face of policy innovations.62  What’s less clear is
and nurses’ tendencies to inaccurately assess the decision-making competence of the
dying).
58 See Okie, supra note 26, at A6 (suggesting that predicted dire consequences R
have not occurred in Oregon).
59 See Ganzini et al., supra note 26, at 563 (reporting that physicians grant one in R
six requests for a prescription for lethal medication).
60 See id.  at 559 tbl.1 (showing that thirty-seven percent of physicians reported
they were unwilling to prescribe lethal medication and twelve percent were uncer-
tain whether they were willing to do so); Okie, supra note 26, at A6 (reporting that R
one Catholic health care organization operating three hospitals in Portland prohibits
doctors from participating in PAS).
61 See supra note 14 (regarding the Oregon statute).  Although initially approved R
by citizens’ initiative in November 1994, implementation of the statute was delayed
by injunction until 1997. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997)
(vacating the permanent injunction ordered by the lower court at 869 F. Supp. 1491
(D. Or. 1994)).
62 Eric Posner, for example, has suggested reason to be chary of attempted gov-
ernment engineering of social norms, as “social norms are complex, poorly under-
stood, and sensitive to factors that are difficult to control.” ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS 8 (2000).
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how long we have to wait for change to verify the null
hypothesis.
Again, we have an argument from Posner—this time quasi-em-
pirical—that the putative costs for PAS may not be so great as
some contend.  Again, we lack both a value and a methodology
for fixing that value for this component of our analysis.  But per-
haps we may forgive an uncertain and contentious intuition
about familiar elements of the PAS policy debate, if Posner’s
model of regime change, and the likely effects of change on con-
sumption, proves fruitful.
II
A MODEL OF CONSUMPTION
The centerpiece of Posner’s PAS discussion is his formal model
of PAS legalization as a sort of information-bearing technology.
Here, Posner leaves behind the complex, perhaps fractional, pol-
icy debate for the question whether legalization would, in fact,
prompt more or fewer cases of suicide.63  That is, he describes the
semantics for a formal inequality that would model a decrease in
the rational consumption of suicide under certain conditions.64
The gist of Posner’s argument is this: rational (utility-maximiz-
ing) consumers of a good—suicide—might decrease consumption
of that good, in the face of lowered price, under certain condi-
tions; that is, briefly, where neither the demand for the good nor
the cost of the good remains constant.65
Posner sees the choice between his proposed legal regime and
the status quo as, essentially, the choice between static and dy-
namic decision procedures under conditions of uncertainty.  That
is, under the present legal regime, one chooses between commit-
ting suicide now or not at all, whereas under the contemplated
legal regime one chooses between committing suicide now, later,
63 Of course, from a strict cost-benefit perspective the two questions cannot be
taken as independent.  There is some ambiguity whether Posner is arguing that legal-
ization of PAS will reduce the overall number of suicides or that it will reduce the
number of suicides among those persons he considers the best candidates for legal-
ized PAS.  The points are, of course, consistent but different. See supra note 10 and R
accompanying text.
64 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 245-48.  The argument itself has the form of a R
sorites , as, in fact, every stage of formal analysis, but for the statement of the conclu-
sions, is left to the reader.
65 Id.
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or not at all.  Under the present regime, an individual will com-
mit suicide if:
pUd > (1 – p) Uh + c
where p  is the relevant probability, c  is the total cost (finan-
cial, pain, suffering, anxiety, etc.) of committing suicide, Ud  is the
utility to be derived from living in the “doomed state,” and Uh  is
the utility to be derived from living in the healthy state.66  That is
just a way of saying that one will commit suicide just in case the
expected utility of present suicide (as potential pain or suffering
avoided) exceeds the expected utility of continued life plus the
costs entailed by the act of suicide.67
Sometimes, the decision to commit suicide will hinge on c .  To
the extent Ud and Uh have like values, the decision to commit
suicide will hinge on c .  Because c—seen as a sort of transaction
cost—is substantial under the present legal regime, many will
avoid suicide altogether precisely because of that transaction
cost, not because of any great utility to continued life (or delta in
utilities between living and dying).  Moreover, where a prognosis
is bleak, many will choose to commit suicide—despite some non-
trivial degree of doubt regarding the prognosis—because to de-
lay the choice risks incapacity which, under the present legal re-
gime, will remove the choice.68
Remove the now-or-never dilemma by introducing a new in-
formation-bearing technology—PAS—and that latter class of sui-
cides disappears.  That is, when, upon grim but uncertain
prognosis, the patient may easily postpone the decision whether
to commit suicide because suicide assistance may be obtained
later, a rational choice to commit suicide will obtain only when –
Uh > c .69  But as it is supposed that both Uh and c  are positive,
this class of preemptive suicides disappears; and the class disap-
pears independent of the fact that we have reduced the value of c
66 Id.  at 245-46.
67 Id.  at 246.
68 This is, of course, not quite true.  First, although physical incapacity may greatly
add to the cost of suicide under the present legal regime, it is simply not true that it
renders the cost either actually or practically infinite.  Posner himself recognizes that
there is a non-zero supply of unlawful and sub rosa  PAS available even outside the
state of Oregon.  Hence, at least the generality of a now-or-never dilemma may be
limited, even under the present legal regime.  Second, we might note that the dy-
namics are artificially restrictive under Posner’s model in any case.  There is no way
to account for, e.g., the perceived rate of change in circumstances and the effect that
such perceptions may play in decision-making.
69 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 247. R
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(the cost).  That is, to the extent that life in the present has some
positive value, one could not rationally trade that value against a
state of affairs that is presumed to have no value, either positive
or negative, in and of itself, but the achievement of which entails
some positive cost.
Think of Posner’s story this way: Under the first regime (a
model of the general prohibition), a terminally ill patient (or any-
one else) must, at time T1, decide whether to commit suicide.
The price of the undertaking is held to be relatively high, partly
because the patient lacks expertise (and presumably experience)
in the successful commission of suicide, partly because there is
some cost to violating the law, and partly because committing
suicide at time T1 involves a substantial opportunity cost in the
face of incomplete medical information and positively valued life
foregone.70  If one’s health is seriously declining at T1, waiting
until a subsequent time T2—for better information, closer prox-
imity to the threshold between positive and negative utility for
existence, etc.—promises benefits, but benefits bought at the fol-
lowing price: by the time things are truly awful, and more cer-
tainly bleak, the would-be suicide may no longer be capable of
ending her own life.  Absent the availability of lawful PAS, the
price of suicide skyrockets simultaneously with the patient’s inca-
pacity.  Committing suicide at time T1 is a sort of hedge against
both that skyrocketing cost and anticipated horror.  In the limit,
the possibility of obtaining such a hedge may be seen as a now-
or-never dilemma.
Under Posner’s alternative regime—legal PAS—the patient at
time T1 will very likely wait until some subsequent time T2 for at
least two reasons: first, because there is, at least initially, sup-
posed to be a positive value to continued life (and because costs
remain high at T1 under both regimes), there is some impetus to
wait; second, because it is anticipated that the price of suicide will
drop—not rise—sharply with the advent of the patient’s incapac-
ity, as PAS under the contemplated regime is only permitted for
those who cannot help themselves.
Several things differentiate T2 under the competing models.
First, because PAS is lawfully available the technical impedi-
ments to suicide (the risk of pain, the risk of horrible but not
fatal self-injury) drop even as information about the patient—
and likely futures—becomes more readily available.  Thus, costs
70 See id.
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drop.  Second, because information becomes cheaper, doubts
about the patient and her condition are, at the margin, likely re-
duced.  And thus, the initial class of potential consumers is parti-
tioned into several.  Most crudely: for some demand increases,
for some it remains constant, and for some it decreases.  If de-
mand drops enough—either because things are not as bad as
originally feared or because one dies of natural causes (or medi-
cal error) in the meantime—one will not consume PAS despite
the lower price.
This is a somewhat expanded consideration of Posner’s basic
intuition; namely, that where the price of present, unassisted sui-
cide is greater than the utility of “the dying state,” suicide con-
sumption will be suppressed, and that the utility of the dying
state might actually be increased via the law’s permission of
PAS.71  Of course, Posner is aware that a drop in consumption is
not logically inevitable with a shift from the first regime (no legal
PAS) to the second (legal PAS).72  But Posner suggests that the
model has general plausibility and that there are reasons for
optimism:
The general point—that the availability of a service can reduce
rather than, as one might expect, increase the utilization of the
service—is neither inconsistent with assuming rational behav-
ior by persons facing horrific choices nor limited to suicide.
Suppose that you get a sharp pain in your abdomen on Friday
afternoon.  If your physician’s office is closed on weekends,
you may rush to the office on Friday, lest your condition
worsen during the weekend.  But if the office is open on week-
ends you may decide to wait and see whether the pain gets
better or worse.  In most cases it will get better, so there will
be fewer total visits, in the class of cases represented by the
example, if the physician is more available.73
Indeed one may do just that.  But there are many yarns we can
spin, and not all are consistent with the claim that increased of-
fice hours results in decreased visits to the office, a claim that—
taken most generally—is paradoxical on its face.  Here is a tale
that bears the distinction of being true, however it might prove or
fail as a model.  That is, I’ve heard this tale as an historical report
rather than imagined it as a counterfactual.  While serving as a
71 Id.  at 248.
72 See id.  at 248-49 (contemplating the cost of suicide as an important factor in the
suicide rate and the possibility that persons might systematically underestimate ei-
ther the likelihood or severity of the doomed state).
73 Id. at 248.
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physician on a reservation, under the aegis of the United States
Public Health Service, my acquaintance “Dr. J” saw patients
without charge at all hours of the day and night.  Readers may be
somewhat (or not at all) surprised to learn that patients con-
sulted Dr. J on all manner of affliction—including boredom,
loneliness, minor gastro-intestinal irritation, headache, nausea,
and intoxication—at all hours.  They did not necessarily wait un-
til Monday—or even Saturday morning—just because they knew
they could be seen over the weekend or after.  This is not to cast
aspersions on the residents of any particular unnamed reserva-
tion.  Faced with an available (read: less expensive) good—free
weekend visits, day or night—persons consumed more than they
would otherwise have done.  That is normal market behavior,
ceteris paribus .  Indeed, such behavior is “normal” in the deepest
sense of the word: it is not merely typical but paradigmatic—
even nomological—market behavior.
Greater convenience appeared to raise consumption.  Feel a
sharp pain on Friday and you may or may not wait to see a doc-
tor.  Feel a sharp pain on Saturday and you may fail to wait until
Monday, if the doctor will see you Saturday or Sunday.  That is
true even if your condition is one that would, known or unbe-
knownst to you, resolve itself by Monday.  And that is true de-
spite the fact that present—rather than postponed—medical
intervention carries its own risks.
Here’s the rub: Posner supposes that demand will generally de-
crease because, just as with tummy aches, “[i]n most cases it will
get better.”74  But that’s not necessarily so, even for ailments that
typically get better.  Moreover, although it is true that doctors
make mistakes—in diagnoses and otherwise—it is not obvious
that patients diagnosed with terminal, debilitating disease typi-
cally “get better.”  And the difference between the two legal re-
gimes is not just that “the availability of physician-assisted
suicide increases the option value of continued living.”75  For
under the second regime (Posner’s version of permissible PAS),
the price of the good decreases substantially at T2—relative to T1
under the second regime and relative to any time  under the first
regime.  Trivially, lowering the price of a good may increase con-
sumption even if demand remains constant; depending on what
74 Id.
75 Id.
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drops at what rate, it may increase consumption even if demand
decreases.
Posner is right when he argues that lowering the price of a sub-
stitute for a good will tend to reduce the demand for that good.
And he’s technically right that, “nothing in economics teaches
that this reduction must be fully offset by the increased demand
for the [substitute] good.”76  Very generally, we do not suppose
that the simplest snapshot characterization of the relationship be-
tween price and demand must hold across markets and time.
Still, I believe that Posner is wrong to suggest that there is no
tension between his projection and the law of demand; roughly,
the utility of the snapshot model exceeds its boundary conditions,
strictly conceived.  That is a good thing generally.  And in this
particular case, I suspect that the fact of reduced cost is not likely
to be swamped by other changes in the relevant market.77  To
make the case otherwise, at the very least, Posner ought to have
done more work to close the problem space, and to show why
alternative models are not likely applicable to this good , for these
consumers , under these conditions .  Rules that hold ceteris
paribus may not hold where all is not equal.  But assuming that
they function in inverse cannot be as trivial as Posner appears to
suppose.
In fairness, we may note again that Posner does not take it to
be certain that legalized PAS will suppress suicide consumption.
Rather, he argues at length that legalization of PAS “might . . .
reduce  the number of suicides and postpone  the suicides that oc-
cur.”78  Bracketing the qualification, we note that there is a sort
of double gap in the analysis here.  Posner rightly spends a great
portion of his chapter trying to tease out the implications of le-
galization on demand for and consumption of PAS.  Surely we
cannot begin to tally costs and benefits attending some change in
76 Id. at 250.
77 In part, it depends how you measure the units of consumption.  Introduce a
generic—and much cheaper—form of Prozac, and consumption of name-brand
Prozac will likely drop.  Should the generic Prozac be packaged in a form that lasts
longer (a stronger dose, or a timed-release dose), the number of pills sold may drop,
even in the face of a lower average cost per pill for that form of serotonin re-uptake
inhibitor.  We do not need anyone to bother with the proof.  Likewise, we do not
need anyone to bother with proving that the number of persons consuming that
form of antidepressant may increase, even with fewer pills, or that the number of
person/days on serotonin re-uptake inhibitors may increase, etc., as it becomes
cheaper to medicate oneself against depression.
78 POSNER, supra  note 10, at 244. R
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the law before we have at least a general sense of the conse-
quences of that change.
Critically, we need to know more systematically—ideally with
some precision—which and how many persons will bear the first-
party costs and enjoy (although “enjoy” is surely the wrong
word) the first-party benefits of legalized PAS, if we are to begin
to develop some sense of the utility of the proposed policy
change.  To that end, being unclear about both the ordinal and
the magnitude of change in consumption attending legalization
cannot be regarded as a minor imprecision of argument.
Before moving on to the question of third-party costs, I think it
important to consider another aspect of Posner’s model; that is,
the fundamental question of uncertainty as regards decision-
making under either extant or contemplated legal regimes.  To
that end, I want to consider both the empirical question of the
extent to which such decision-making is likely to be impaired and
the conceptual question how to conceive of possible errors in de-
cision-making.
III
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT IN HOSPITALIZED
ELDERLY PATIENTS
Robert A. Burt has suggested that communication problems
may arise due to various “confusional states” that may be preva-
lent in the elderly.79  This is a point well worth examination.
Burt’s brief discussion raises a concern that, if borne out, does
more than cast the terminal elderly as a vulnerable population; it
casts in doubt the promise of PAS for the largest, and socially the
broadest, population of possible candidates.  Communication
problems raise questions of information costs and, possibly, in-
formation asymmetries for those who would participate in a PAS
transaction.  Perhaps more difficult, they raise questions about
our ordinary assumptions about consent and contractual compe-
tence, assumptions that may not be tenable—at least as default
assumptions—in this odd and particular case.
The term “confusional states” has fallen into disuse.  It was
widely considered ambiguous and does not describe a category of
mental impairment in the DSM-IV.80  Nonetheless, Burt’s point
79 Burt, supra  note 57, at 172-73. R
80 See Z.J. Lipowski, Transient Cognitive Disorders (Delerium, Acute Confusional
States) in the Elderly , 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1426, 1427 (1983) (proposing the
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remains important, for the pieces of research he discussed of-
fered systematic accounts of bona fide cognitive impairments in
the elderly; this is a case of revised taxonomy, not null reference.
Recast, the general observations remain: (1) cognitive impair-
ments are common among the elderly, terminal patients that con-
stitute the largest body of candidates for PAS;81 (2) such
impairments are often difficult to detect and in many cases are
not detected by the physicians and nurses caring for impaired pa-
tients;82 and (3) because of such impairments, “obtaining a truly
informed consent is problematic.”83
Here, we are chiefly concerned with certain cognitive—as op-
posed to affective—disorders, with impairments to reasoning and
memory classified as delirium, dementia, and amnestic and other
cognitive disorders.84  This is in contrast with the mood disorders
and anxiety disorders that were Kohm and Brigner’s focus,
though in many cases such conditions may similarly confound the
problem of bona fide volitional choice, may well appear as
comorbid, and indeed may interact with cognitive impairments.85
In brief, a delirium is characterized by a disturbance of con-
sciousness and a change in cognition that develops over a short
period of time,86 not typically longer than one month.87  “A de-
mentia is characterized by multiple cognitive deficits that include
abandonment of the term “acute confusional states” as partial solution to the “se-
mantic muddle”); see also DSM-IV, supra  note 38, at 123-63 (discussing delerium, R
dementia, and amnestic and other cognitive disorders).
81 See  Burt, supra  note 57, at 172 (citing Eduardo Bruera, Issues of Symptom R
Control in Patients with Advanced Cancer , AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE,
Mar./Apr. 1993, at 12, 13, which observed impairments in eighty-three percent of
study patients before death).
82 See Burt, supra  note 57, at 172 n.58 (citing J. Francis et al., A Prospective Study
of Delirium in Hospitalized Elderly , 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1097, 1098, 1100 (1990),
which suggested that physicians frequently fail to recognize cognitive impairment
because of its fluctuating features and subtle presentation).
83 See  Burt, supra  note 57, at 172 n.58 (quoting Neil MacDonald, Suffering and
Dying in Cancer Patients:  Research Frontiers in Controlling Confusion, Cachexia,
and Dyspnea , 163 W. J. MED. 278, 280-81 (1995); see also RUTH R. FADDEN & TOM
L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986), for a
substantial general discussion of the topic of informed consent.
84 See DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 124-26. R
85 See  Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care ,
35 DUQ. L. REV. 455 (1996) (considering the special problems raised by the role of
depression in requests for PAS, considering the disparate incidence of depression
among elderly women).
86 See DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 123. R
87 See id.  at 126; Lipowski, supra note 80, at 1427. R
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impairment in memory.”88  Dementia may, like delirium, be re-
mitting, or it may have a static or progressive course, often being
associated with other diseases and fatality.89  Amnestic disorders
are “characterized by memory impairment in the absence of
other significant cognitive impairments.”90  Like dementia, am-
nestic disorders present a highly variable course, depending on
the underlying etiology of the impairment.91  Finally, “confu-
sional states” may fit the catch-all category of “cognitive disorder
not otherwise specified.”92  Note that any of these impairments
has the potential to disturb effective decision making on the part
of the patient, as they may impair: (1) gathering information, in
dialogue with a physician or otherwise; (2) retaining information
critical to decision making; (3) having all the relevant informa-
tion “present” (cognitively accessible) during decision-making;
(4) formulating a sound decision based on the limited informa-
tion at hand; (5) formulating a decision that is stable rather than
transitory; and (6) communicating a stable decision to caregivers.
Again, Burt’s observation that cognitive deficits—“confusional
states”—are common among the dying is borne out by diverse
research.  Indeed, his cited figure seems low.93  This is likely due,
in part, to the difficulty of detecting various deficits and, in part,
to the higher incidence of delirium among the elderly.94
“[B]etween one-third and one-half of the hospitalized elderly are
likely to be delirious at some point.”95  And this does not nearly
exhaust the range of relevant cognitive and affective deficits.
88 DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 123. R
89 See id.  at 137-38.
90 Id.  at 123.
91 See id.  at 156-57 (reporting significant variation holding etiology constant, as
well).
92 See id.  at 163.
93 See  Francis et al., supra note 82, at 1098, 1100 (suggesting that “delirium oc- R
curred in over one-fifth of subjects”).
94 Lipowski, supra note 80, at 1427 (citing studies reporting that incidence is up to R
four times higher over the age of forty, and highest still over the age of seventy); F.J.
Flint & Shelagh M. Richards, Organic Basis of Confusional States in the Elderly ,
BRIT. MED. J. 1537 (1956) (suggesting that “[m]ental confusion is a relatively com-
mon feature of illness in old people”).
95 See Lipowski, supra note 80, at 1427 (citing H.M. Hodkinson, Mental Impair- R
ments in the Elderly , 7 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS 305 (1973) (finding an incidence of
thirty-five percent in a multi-center British study of geriatric patients over sixty-five
years old); and P.D. Bedford, General Medical Aspects of Confusional States in Eld-
erly People , 2 BRIT. MED. J. 185 (1959) (finding an incidence of eighty percent
among 5,000 patients of at least sixty-five years admitted to the Oxford Geriatric
Unit)).
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The observation that cognitive impairment is often—in fact, typi-
cally—undetected likewise enjoys diverse support.96  Here we
are concerned not just with inadequacies in the process of ob-
taining informed consent, but with impairments to competence
itself, one of the fundamental prerequisites to informed consent.
All of this may occur in patients well able to read and sign a
consent form.97  More generally, we are concerned with whether
our default assumptions about contractual competence in the
most general sense can be maintained in a particular medical
setting.
Clinical difficulties in identifying cognitive impairment are
likely to be to some degree intransigent.  For example, they are
not eliminated in palliative care settings, where “doctors and
nurses spend more time talking to patients than the average phy-
sician and nurse.”98  And such clinical failures can arise under
standards of practice that are unlikely to appear defective in
standard quality-of-care metrics.99  This is the biomedical foun-
dation or baseline from which we might begin to ask whether
effective consent procedures might plausibly be constructed.
And it is atop this foundation that we might consider further con-
founding factors such as susceptibility to coercion and the gen-
eral tendency towards some degree of failure in the
implementation of facially plausible legal safeguards.100
That is not to say that problems of competence and consent
96 See, e.g. , Eduardo Bruera et al., Cognitive Failure in Cancer Patients in Clinical
Trials , 341 LANCET 247, 248 (1993) (reporting detection, by specific assessment
tools, of moderate to severe cognitive failure that had not been noticed by both the
principal investigator and the research nurse involved in the study); Rogelio I.
Thomas et al., A Prospective Study of Delirium and Prolonged Hospital Stay , 45
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 937, 939 (1988) (reporting that in a study of 133 hospi-
talized patients, only one in twenty delirious patients was diagnosed as such by the
attending staff).
97 See  Burt, supra note 57, at 173 (quoting Bruera, supra  note 81). R
98 Burt, supra  note 57, at 173 (quoting Bruera, supra  note 81, at 12). R
99 See supra  note 51 and accompanying text.  To the extent that such measures
tend to be based either on outcomes or on ex post surveys of patient satisfaction, it is
difficult to envision how they might reveal cases of failed consent.  Auditing of con-
sent forms might reveal certain forms of egregious procedure, but would not provide
independent evidence of suitability for consent procedures that are typically
legitimate.
100 See  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 795 (1997) (recognizing “the real risk of sub-
tle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations”); Callahan, supra  note 16, R
at 52-55 (regarding a general tendency to imperfect implementation of and adher-
ence to legal standards and observing casual Dutch attitudes toward euthanasia and
the law in particular).
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need be fundamentally intractable.  But it is to raise a very seri-
ous question about our standard assumptions concerning the util-
ity of additional “choices.”  Absent such assumptions, we face a
difficult task in specifying the sort of institutional structures that
might set the cost-benefit balancing right again.  Posner suggests
that fears of involuntary euthanasia “can be minimized by rela-
tively simple regulations, such as a requirement that the patient’s
consent . . . be witnessed or in writing, that the physician . . .
report . . . to a hospital committee, and that . . . he consult with a
duly certified specialist in the ethics of dealing with dying pa-
tients.”101  This suggestion appears optimistic, to say the least.
Questions about what sort of certification is due are almost
beside the point.  Posner’s institutional suggestion cannot be ade-
quate to the task.  It might or might not be costly to implement—
reflect on the burdens already faced by Institutional Review
Boards for human subjects research—but it is unlikely to identify
most of the problem cases whatever its cost.102  Again, those pro-
fessionals best equipped to do the screening doubt their own
ability to perform reliably in a single exam and there is no obvi-
ous form of outside consultation or documentation adequate to
cure this fundamental defect.103
One might, of course, design better institutional filters for
problematic requests than those suggested by Posner’s “relatively
simple regulations.”  But the obvious questions remain: What
would a reliable screening procedure entail?  What would it cost?
What sort of error rate would a “reliable” screen tolerate?104
101 See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 243. R
102 See, e.g. , Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protect-
ing Human Subjects:  Are We Really Ready to Fix a Broken System? , 26 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2002); Donald F. Phillips, Institutional Review Boards Under
Stress:  Will They Explode or Change? , 276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1623 (1996).
103 See  Burt, supra  note 57, at 172-74.
104 We might note that, with or without better procedures, there exist no candi-
date screening procedures that can plausibly be advanced as either effective or semi-
effective decision procedures for genuine consent.  That is, at the very least, a blow
to improving screening procedures sufficiently to satisfy a zero-tolerance (or near-
zero-tolerance) standard for state-sponsored killing (or murders) absent proper con-
sent.  Note too, that there are at least several routes to a zero- (or near-zero) toler-
ance standard.  Trivially, anyone who finds either suicide or assisted suicide
generally to be in principle  intolerable should hold to such a standard (this is to
mention a widely held assessment, rather than to incorporate its foundations into my
own argument).  In addition, many might object fundamentally to state-sanctioned
or state-sponsored suicide, even without adopting a more general objection to the
act of suicide itself.  Moreover, one might plausibly gauge the costs of implementing
the sort of change in legal regime required for lawful PAS to be so great, even on
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And what is the cost of a mistake?  In addition, we might well
wonder whether implementation of a more rigorous screening
procedure would shrink the market (and possible summed bene-
fits) for PAS even as it implicated substantial process costs; to the
extent that a screen entails additional testing, expert third-party
evaluations, and delays (both for testing generally and to test the
diachronic stability of expressed preferences in particular), the
screen itself might well impugn the promise of PAS to allow ter-
minal patients to choose the timing and manner of their
deaths.105
IV
TALLYING DEATH: THE INTERPERSONAL VALUE OF DYING VS.
THE INTERPERSONAL COST OF KILLING
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Interpersonal Valuation
of Lives
I suggested early on that Posner seemed to have in mind the
most general sort of balancing of costs and benefits for the PAS
debate; that is, that his argument is not wedded to any particular
technical scheme of the sorts implemented in cost-benefit analy-
sis in the agencies.106  To some extent, that is to Posner’s advan-
tage.  For while the techniques of cost-benefit analysis become
increasingly well entrenched, they are hardly uncontroversial in
either their particulars or their most general methodological
commitments.107  At the same time, Posner’s informal approach
behalf of ideal cases that, a very small number of inevitable errors would inevitably
sink social welfare arguments on behalf of such a change.  See, for example, the
Court’s opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacco v.
Quill , 521 U.S. 793 (1997), for a partial catalogue of relevant costs. See also , e.g. ,
Brief for the American Medical Association, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
105 The Oregon statute itself imposes a waiting period of at least fifteen days be-
tween a patient’s initial request for PAS and the writing of a prescription for fatal
medication. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850 (2003).  Similarly, Gert argues that rea-
sonable procedural safeguards for PAS would impose a delay of at least two weeks.
See GERT ET AL., supra  note 44, at 303. R
106 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. R
107 See, e.g. , COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:  LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (offering a useful
collection of essays discussing cost-benefit analysis).  In an earlier essay, Adler and
Posner put it thus:  “The reputation of cost-benefit analysis . . . among American
academics has never been as poor as it is today, while its popularity among agencies
in the United States government has never been greater.”  Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis , 109 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1999).
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may be seen as a limitation.  Absent a problematic method for
comparing our present legal state of affairs with the scheme he
contemplates, Posner may be left with no systematic method at
all.  Even with deference to Posner’s very strong view of the in-
formation benefits implicit in PAS, common-law and economics
techniques—such as focusing on a salient, dominant, and univo-
cal economic effect of some considered policy or other—simply
do not appear to be available in this case.108  I have already sug-
gested that it is conspicuous that Posner’s calculation is seriously
incomplete.  What is more, he has skirted entirely a raft of tech-
nical difficulties posed by questions he himself has recognized.
What would a more complete analysis look like, supposing that
such a thing is at all tractable?
The PAS question is in many ways the sort of question to
which cost-benefit analysis is often applied.109  Contemplating
the costs and benefits of legalized PAS entails considering nu-
merous non-market and quasi-market phenomena.  This is true
both within the health care arena and without.  It also entails
contemplating a policy change that is liable to be enmeshed in a
significant regulatory environment itself.  Moreover, one of the
most striking issues in the PAS debate is the question of how we
attach value—either positive or negative—to certain sorts of
lives.  That is a question at the heart of much methodological de-
bate about cost-benefit analysis more generally.110  For there we
108 See, e.g. , Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741-45 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring).  In Chicago Board of Realtors , Judge Posner
(joined by Judge Easterbrook) offered several straightforward economic arguments
(together with perhaps one or more controversial ones) regarding certain Chicago
housing regulations that would tend to prompt overlapping effects of increased
rental prices and reduced supply of rental housing.  The most straightforward and
least controversial of these concerns the theoretical and empirical effects of rent
control (not itself actually at issue in the decision), as it tends to suppress the supply
of low-rent housing.
109 See Paul Davidson, The Valuation of Public Goods , in ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 345 (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 1972), for a general
discussion of cost-benefit methodology.
110 See, e.g. , W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPON-
SIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity , 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843
(2000) (discussing both the general notion of equalizing costs per life saved across
policy initiatives and the particular values properly attributable to such savings).
But see, e.g. , John Broome, Trying to Value a Life , 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (1978); FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, THE $6.1 MILLION QUESTION, (Global Dev. and
Env’t Inst., G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-06, 2002) (discussing problems with ho-
mogenous valuation of lives of just this sort and, in the latter case, also questioning
the particular values attached in the literature), at  http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publica-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 30  5-MAY-05 12:04
1268 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
find ample disagreement about both the propriety and the partic-
ulars of fixing, as a policy matter, an interpersonal monetary
value for human lives.  I want to suggest that these issues should
be especially salient in the present debate in at least two ways.
First, standard valuations of statistical lives—especially mono-
tonic valuations abstracted from age and health—appear to pre-
sent an exceedingly poor fit for concerns about loss of life in end-
of-life decision-making generally.  Second, as I have argued, any
policy proposal for the legalization of PAS must, as a practical
matter, contemplate a non-trivial error rate, delivering a “ser-
vice” for which nobody properly contracts.111  If that is right,
then the cost of such errors themselves calls for valuation.
The literature on monetary valuations of human lives of the
sorts contemplated by cost-benefit analysis is substantial.  It is
beyond the scope of this Article to provide a thorough review of
that literature, much less to settle the myriad issues raised there.
Still, I think that the problem of PAS is relevant to this area of
the cost-benefit literature for several reasons.112  Most generally,
the details of the PAS debate make especially salient a significant
problem with the interpersonal valuation of lives lost or saved for
policy purposes:  that is, (a) the entire debate over PAS would
never get off the ground were it not for the fact that many people
care very deeply about how they die and not just when they die;
and (b) the variation in preferences and magnitudes of prefer-
ence appears great, and appears to cross-cut familiar and accessi-
ble differences in income, wealth, and education.113
Consideration of PAS may then provide a useful domain in which
tions/working_papers/0106%20revised6_1Million%20Question.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
111 Of course, on some views any intentional killing of the sort entailed by PAS is
an error, perhaps a profound error.  Without wishing to slight those views, what I
have in mind here by “error” is the intentional killing of a medical patient who did
not, in fact, make a competent and informed choice to be killed.  Recall that under
Posner’s policy recommendation, all cases of PAS are cases where the physician is
directly involved in killing the patient, as Posner recommends legalization just in
case the patient (appears to) wish it but suffers “severely disabling and debilitating
. . . illness,” such that he or she “likely” is physically incapable of suicide. POSNER,
supra  note 10, at 237-38. R
112 Note that much of that literature concerns valuations of life from the particu-
lar perspective of environmental law, rather than health law. See, e.g. , ACKERMAN
& HEINZERLING, supra note 110; Lester B. Lave & Eugene P. Seskin, Air Pollution R
and Human Health , 169 SCIENCE 723 (1970) (both criticizing and utilizing, as a de-
fault, a forgone earnings valuation).
113 See, e.g. , Adler & Posner, supra note 107, at 174 (mentioning the distinction R
between cost-benefit analyses that attach a single value across all human lives and
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to consider certain risk management questions in the alternative
to the well-developed cases from the world of environmental reg-
ulation.  Moreover, to the extent that problems from the risk
management literature are problems in assessing the costs of an
intractable and non-trivial rate of error under any PAS scheme
too, then we have a further hurdle for Posner’s analysis and pol-
icy recommendation.
Cost-benefit analysis is often concerned with balancing the
policy costs and benefits attending some means of risk reduc-
tion.114  Commonly, the point of the risk reduction—say, through
environmental regulation regarding a superfund site cleanup—is
a statistical prediction of reduced deaths, according to some like-
lihood and degree of confidence.115  Because the assessment is
fundamentally stochastic and predictive, we may know with
greater or lesser precision the population from which the puta-
tive n  lives are saved, but not the particular individuals who are
actually to live or die under the policy initiative.  Thus, we need
an interpersonal value for each life (supposedly) saved if we are
to balance benefits against costs.116
Perhaps the most commonly used method for fixing a value in
the agencies is W. Kip Viscusi’s “value-of-life” methodology, a
valuation technique that derives its estimates from labor market
data said to reflect willingness to pay to avoid risks.117  Based on
his methodology, Viscusi has estimated the value of life at
roughly $5 million, in 1990 dollars.118
The motivation for a homogenous valuation ought to be con-
spicuous, especially from a policy perspective.  As Viscusi puts it,
“[o]ne quite reasonable notion of risk equity is that if society is
homogenous in its attitudes towards risk, then agencies should
the common “textbook” technique of valuation that varies according to income or
wealth).
114 See, e.g. , Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir.
1987) (Posner, J., concurring).
115 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives , 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999) (re-
garding the valuation of human lives in environmental regulation).
116 That is, we require such a value for any larger efficiency analysis of a contem-
plated or extant policy.  At the simplest level, where no benefit other than saved
lives is contemplated, we can of course attribute ordinal efficiency values to compet-
ing policies without assigning any particular dollar value to each life saved.
117 See W. KIP VISCUSI, ANALYSIS OF OMB AND OSHA EVALUATIONS OF THE
HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROPOSAL (report prepared for Secretary of Labor Ray-
mond Donovan, March 15, 1982).
118 See id.
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equalize the marginal cost per life saved across regulatory pro-
grams.  Doing so will maximize the number of lives saved for any
given cost amount.”119
This may serve not merely to maximize policy returns (and, not
incidentally, to avoid some of the spectacular imbalances we
have seen in public risk management efforts).120  It may, as well,
impose a certain version of equity on public policy regarding risk
management.121
Nonetheless, there are good grounds to look for heterogeneity.
The main approaches from cost-benefit analysis are either in-
come (or wealth) invariant—fixing a unitary value for the society
as a whole—or not.122  But in no case do we find a metric that
even begins to grapple with the sorts of variation we see in com-
mon preferences regarding medical decisions at the end of life.123
In that regard, we should consider that at least several authors
have questioned whether risk valuations need to account for var-
iations in types of deaths as opposed to deaths simpliciter .  For
example, instantaneous deaths may be valued differently from
those that are prolonged,124 deaths by voluntarily assumed risks
may be valued differently from those by involuntary risks,125 and,
certainly, deaths that are qualitatively awful may be especially
119 Viscusi, supra note 110, at 855. I would be remiss if I were to fail to point out R
that Viscusi himself does not regard this version of risk equity as the last word in
refinement of risk equity measures. Id.  at 857 (discussing “legitimate sources of
heterogeneity”).
120 Viscusi, for example, cites a figure of $131.8 million per case of cancer averted
for a particular 1989 EPA asbestos regulation, an overpayment by more than an
order of magnitude relative to some of the EPA’s other valuations. See id.  at 855.
121 See generally id.
122 Cost-benefit analysis as implemented by the Environmental Protection
Agency has tended to employ valuations of life that are invariant across wealth or
income, although other approaches commonly assign values that range proportion-
ately with (at least categories of) income or wealth. See, e.g. , Adler & Posner, supra
note 107, at 174. R
123 There has been some discussion of the general question of how to parse “pure
mortality risks” from those associated with morbidity preceding mortality. See, e.g. ,
George Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POL-
ICY 339 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994).  To some extent, common morbidity may
be associated with disease-specific risk premiums. See id.  at 340.  At the same time,
that one might, conceptually, parse conditions preceding death—or the environmen-
tal conditions of dying—is not necessarily helpful to the uniform valuation problem
if one cannot in fact, physically, parse environment, cause, and effect.
124 See, e.g. , Revesz, supra  note 115, at 949, 955-56. R
125 See id.  at 968; see also, e.g. , Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic , 90 GEO.
L.J. 2311, 2327 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic , 90 GEO. L.J.
2255, 2285 (2002).
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dreaded.126  Cancer deaths, for example, may generally be con-
sidered worse than others, and some work has been done on risk
premiums paid regarding cancer risks in particular.127
If we return to the illustration of the patient plaintiffs in
Glucksberg , Quill , and, for that matter, Cruzan , it takes little
imagination to fix the variation in utility across something like
means-of-dying as, first, spectacular and, second, exceeding the
bounds of the normal distribution of revealed preferences in
more typical markets.  For example, the pseudonymous plaintiff
class in Glucksberg included a sixty-nine-year-old retired pedia-
trician who suffered from cancer, which, by 1994, had metasta-
sized.  She was bedridden for more than a year before her case
reached trial, and was constantly in pain during that time.  In ad-
dition, she suffered from swollen legs, bed sores, poor appetite,
nausea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and
general weakness.  The class also included a forty-four-year-old
artist dying of AIDS who had experienced bouts of pneumonia;
chronic, severe skin and sinus infections; grand mal  seizures; ex-
treme fatigue; and suffered from cytomegalovirus retinitis, a de-
generative disease, which robbed him of most of his sight; and a
sixty-nine-year-old retired sales representative who suffered
from emphysema, which caused him a constant sensation of suf-
focating and required constant connection to oxygen, and who
also suffered from heart failure.128  Nancy Cruzan, by contrast,
was, following an automobile accident, confined to a Missouri
state hospital in a persistent vegetative state when the Court
heard her (guardians’) appeal.129  These cases are all pitiable.
They are not, however, homogeneous.130  Neither are they typi-
126 See, e.g. , Revesz, supra  note 115, at 961. R
127 See  John R. Lott, Jr. & Richard L. Manning, Have Changing Liability Rules
Compensated Workers Twice for Occupational Hazards? Earnings Premiums and
Cancer Risks , 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 118 (2000) (reporting, e.g., an estimated annual
premium of $2,983 for workers in industries with cancer exposure one standard
deviation greater than the mean); see also  Tolley et al., supra  note 123, at 340-41. R
But cf.  Sunstein, supra  note 55, at 1141 (suggesting that willingness to pay to avoid R
cancer risk varies substantially with the description of the cancer).
128 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-57 (1994).
129 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
130 Plainly, they are similar in that each of the Glucksberg plaintiffs sought PAS.
The point is that, symptomatically, the population of parties interested in PAS is
diverse; indeed, it appears that several of the women assisted by the infamous Dr.
Jack Kevorkian were not, in fact, suffering from a fatal illness when they were killed.
See, e.g. , Kohm & Brigner, supra note 45, at 244, 271-305, 306 (offering a case-by- R
case analysis of 58 women “assisted” in committing suicide by Dr. Kevorkian).
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cal.131  Contrast such cases—where either the patient or some
putative advocate therefore has attached some negative value to
continued life—with the myriad everyday cases in which patients
seek some means to extend life (or, for example, in hospice cases,
where they seek at least to live their remaining days under cer-
tain conditions).  Together, such cases call into question whether
any particular value might reasonably be applied here—across
cases, patients, time, etc.—and, so, whether there is any particu-
lar “good” to be so valued.
Of course, any policy initiative can serve to impose a fixed val-
uation—whether market-based or not—on the unwilling.  To that
extent, there is nothing special about the problem of policy valu-
ations of human lives or means to death and conditions of dying.
What is more plausibly special is the degree to which preferences
vary and, at least for many persons, the degree to which that vari-
ation involves or constitutes something deeply personal and cru-
cially important.132  There are two basic questions here, and the
second may be regarded as a special case of the first.  The first
has to do with what sort of imagined end-of-life market the usual
value-of-life proxies are to substitute for.  Given the diversity of
contexts in which end-of-life decisions are faced—and the diver-
sity and instability of reported preferences across those con-
texts—is there some particular demand here to be charted?  The
second has to do with whether we conceive state-sanctioned
deaths differently according to whether they are accidental or
not:  how clear do we have to be on the “S” in PAS and how do
we calculate the social cost when the attribution of consent is in
error?
With regard to the first question, I want to suggest that the
debate over PAS provides ample ground for the following con-
jecture: (1) any attempt to construct a monotonic interpersonal
valuation for human life, ranging across the contexts seen in end-
of-life decision making, is liable to be intractable; and (2) any
attempt to construct a proxy market for the risks posed by end-
Equally plain is what, so far as I know, nobody in the pro-PAS camp denies; that is,
that people under extremely similar symptoms express very different preferences
with regards to end-of-life decisions generally, and PAS in particular.
131 See generally  SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE DIE (1993).
132 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist’s sharp anti-PAS opinion in Glucksberg  recog-
nized the concern with the preservation of “dignity and independence at the end of
life” prompted by the myriad issues raised by contemporary medicine and medical
technology.  521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997).
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of-life decision making under a PAS regime is liable to be equally
intractable—the supposed relationship between the proxy and
ideal markets being fatally instable, if not simply question-beg-
ging.  I would suggest, further, that the confounding factors in
such a constructive project are liable to cross-cut the usual filters
involved in multi-valued valuations of human life (income,
wealth, education, etc.) and are liable to arise from factors cen-
tral to the individual preference functions that an interpersonal
valuation is supposed—somehow—to aggregate.
To put it another way, fixing an interpersonal valuation of life
for regulatory purposes typically supposes that there is an ade-
quate proxy market—say in certain aspects of the labor mar-
ket—to stand for imagined, but nonexistent, markets in degrees
of safety-by-regulation.  If the proxy is to function as an ana-
logue, or contingent valuation, for the salient but hypothetical
market at issue, the proxy market must function as an adequate
model  of the hypothetical market; if not, the proxy is only a
proxy by fiat.133  Thus, an adequate proxy market supposes that
both the proxy and that for which the proxy plays stand-in
have—or would have, if realized—certain features in common.134
At least with regard to basic market features, the two should be,
in the ideal case, isomorphic.  Some of these features may be
thought of as substantive—for example, that the real and
imagined markets appear to be driven by the same underlying
preferences.  Some of these features may be thought of as struc-
tural—for example, that real and imagined demand should have
the same degree of diachronic stability or volatility and that, gen-
erally, the real and imagined demand should be formally simi-
lar—the demand curves should have the same form and similar
variance, and that demand should partition the population (mar-
ket) in the same way, etc.  I believe that both the substantive and
structural assumptions are dubious in this case.
133 See, e.g. , Sunstein, supra  note 125, at 2275 (noting that the EPA had “some- R
what astonishingly” assumed chronic bronchitis might serve as an adequate ana-
logue to non-fatal cancers for risk management purposes).
134 The empirical  connection between the proxy market and the ideal one it rep-
resents may be relatively strong or weak, ranging from the substitution of “shadow
price[s]” through analogous markets or hypothetical valuation.  Heinzerling, supra
note 125, at 2314-15.  Of course, one must turn to a proxy market only when the
ideal one does not exist in the marketplace and hence has no measurable attributes.
But the best proxies suggest formal conditions that would be satisfied were imagined
markets to come into being (say, by the lifting of a legal ban) and it is well to keep
that in mind when considering various substitutes.
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Of course, significant interpersonal variation, on its own, might
cut either way in the PAS debate; hence the very divergent ma-
jority opinions in Cruzan , on the one hand, and Glucksberg , on
the other.  Indeed, the argument of the plaintiffs in Glucksberg
was precisely that the fundamental interests protected by the
Court in Cruzan  ought to be extended to those seeking legally
sanctioned PAS precisely because of the intensely personal and
highly varied preferences at stake.135  If the Court was unani-
mous in rejecting that proposed extension, it was nonetheless
sensitive to the problems motivating the complaint.136
The complexity of medical decisions at the end of life may
highlight a methodological problem for cost-benefit analyses of a
certain sort, but the complexity may speak in favor of protecting
individual autonomy, rather than restricting it.  And that would
appear to favor Judge Posner’s overall policy recommendation, if
not a particular means of justification for it.  That Posner took
such pains to show that PAS could effectively reduce the inci-
dence of suicide overall and focus remaining suicides on informa-
tion-rich patients, makes even more sense if it supposes, rather
than ignores, problems in valuing lives.
There is, however, another problem.  Recall Section III’s dis-
cussion of cognitive impairments among the elderly and the at-
tendant concern about diagnostic error.  If those concerns are
well founded, then any legalized form of PAS—and certainly the
one contemplated by Posner—will do at least two things: (1) it
will permit well-informed, freely choosing, terminal patients to
elect physician assistance in hastening death; and (2) it will cause
certain patients to be killed without those patients’ having made
such a choice.  The question is not just one of how we value vari-
ous sorts of lives, whether individual-by-individual or group-by-
group.  The question is rather how we begin to value the practice
of a certain sort of killing.  I suggest that that question involves
difficult, if not intractable, issues of both first-person and third-
person valuations of the costs of violating or suspending some of
our most deeply entrenched moral norms.
135 See, e.g. , Brief for Respondents, at 7, 12, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
136 See, e.g. , Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 735 (reflecting on the “earnest and profound
debate” regarding PAS); see also id.  at 736-37 (Justice O’Connor, concurring) (fo-
cusing the putative right on cases of “great suffering”); id . at 782 (Justice Souter,
concurring) (“[T]he importance of the individual interest here . . . cannot be
gainsaid.”).
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It might, of course, be argued that we ought simply to look at
wrongful death settlements to fix a value for PAS errors (inten-
tional killings under what would be legally sanctioned circum-
stances, but for the absence of the requisite proper consent).  But
that is variously unsatisfactory.  For one thing, the cases are diffi-
cult to compare where the contemplated wrongful deaths may be
exceedingly difficult to identify post hoc .  For another, to look at
wrongful death settlements (and verdicts) is to wander from the
policy goal of a simple and consistent valuation across income,
wealth, age, etc.  Moreover—and critical here—is that a wrongful
death proxy would not contemplate the social cost of policies
that sanction wrongful and intentional  killings above and beyond
the costs to the particular victims killed.
I simply do not know how to complete the policy analysis Pos-
ner contemplates.  Before closing, I do, however, want to do two
things.  First, I want to address the question I have raised regard-
ing the costs of killing versus the costs of allowing someone to
die.  This is, of course, a disputed distinction in the PAS litera-
ture.137  Still, I think it useful to trace at least some of the poten-
tial costs Posner has ignored and to further develop this category
of costs.  The conclusion of that discussion will not be a com-
pleted cost-benefit analysis for PAS, although it will imply that
Posner omitted very substantial costs in his social welfare
calculus for PAS.  Second, I want to suggest, briefly, how one
might proceed if the project of cost-benefit analysis proves
intractable.
B. The Cost of Killing and a Third-Party Cascade
Earlier, I discussed Posner’s claim that legalization of PAS
would not likely serve to diminish the entrenchment or appear-
ance of norms of medical practice.138  His argument turned, in
part, on a contentious claim that such problems have not arisen
in Dutch practice since the decriminalization in the Netherlands
of what we would consider PAS.139  I mentioned, among other
problems, the familiar one regarding social differences between
137 The respondents’ brief in Quill , for example, termed New York’s distinction
between permissible and impermissible physician assistance in end-of-life treatment
“irrational.”  Brief for Respondents at 44, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No.
95-1858); see also Rachels, supra  note 16 (questioning the integrity of the distinction R
generally).
138 See supra  text accompanying notes 49-50.
139 See supra text accompanying note 51.
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the Netherlands and the United States.140  Following that obser-
vation, I think it worthwhile to consider some of the potential
first-party and third-party costs that might follow legalization, es-
pecially as they relate to medical care and the African-American
population.
A great deal of ink has been spilled over the complicated and
sometimes tragic history of the medical profession’s treatment of
various vulnerable populations.141  That history includes such di-
verse problems as forced surgical experimentation on slaves,142
variable diagnosis and treatment by race and gender despite con-
sistent disease states,143 and communication gaps between medi-
cal professionals and various minority populations.144  Even a
cursory recapitulation of that history is well beyond the scope of
this Article.145  But one general moral to be drawn from that his-
tory is that even seemingly minor issues can have very serious
medical import.  For example, miscommunication between
American physicians and Asian immigrants has—although not
necessarily borne of anything like the virulent, institutionalized
racism that led to the abuse of slaves—led to serious and some-
times fatal misdiagnoses and mistreatment.146  And that—subop-
timal communication with catastrophic consequences—may be a
species of problem with special import for PAS.
Proponents of PAS typically frame their arguments in terms of
patient autonomy.147  In doing so, Posner is hardly unique.  Le-
galized PAS is said to enhance or promote patient autonomy by
providing suffering terminal patients with a means, first, to exert
some control over the timing and manner of their deaths and,
140 See supra text accompanying note 54.
141 See, e.g. , JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD (new & expanded ed. 1993); SUSAN E.
LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE (1995).
142 See LEDERER, supra note 141; David A. Richardson, Ethics in Gynecologic R
Surgical Innovation , 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (1994).
143 See, e.g. , Robert M. Mayberry et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Access to
Medical Care , 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 108 (Supp. 1 2000).
144 See generally BONNIE BLAIR O’CONNOR, HEALING TRADITIONS (1995); ANNE
FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN (1997).
145 For a useful, if necessarily abbreviated, survey focusing on African-Americans,
see Patricia A. King & Leslie E. Wolf, Empowering and Protecting Patients:  Lessons
for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African-American Experience , 82 MINN. L.
REV. 1015 (1998).
146 See FADIMAN, supra  note 144. R
147 See generally, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(No. 95-1858).
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second, to end the suffering itself.148  The argument from auton-
omy may—but need not—gloss the strong social and economic
constraints on end-of-life decision making.  In its most basic
form, the argument is simply that legalization of PAS would pro-
vide, for some, a very welcome alternative in an array of already
limited choices.  Indeed, even the best placed of those terminal
patients for whom PAS is an issue may face a very limited range
of likely unhappy options in any case; discussions of a “good
death” cannot obscure the fact that for many, any  end-of-life
medical decisions are decisions between very limited alternatives,
under conditions of, in effect, extreme scarcity.  For some, the
option to curtail the duration of a dying process that is fraught
with suffering may be extremely valuable.  For others, the choice
may be more difficult.  But ceteris paribus , an additional choice
cannot have a value less than zero.
However, all things are not liable to be equal.  I have already
argued that concerns about the autonomy argument need not be
driven by paternalism, benign or otherwise.  That is, the problem
is not that poor people, the elderly, or African-Americans, when
faced with an additional unfortunate opportunity, will tend to
choose the “wrong” option.  Rather, it is that the notion of
choice is especially complicated in the area of PAS, acutely so for
a non-trivial segment of the elderly, terminal population.  And
the issue becomes further complicated when we consider the
problem of special populations, a problem wholly ignored by
Posner.
First, there is a serious question whether legalization of PAS
would tend to diminish, rather than enhance, the likelihood of
informed choice in an already compromised doctor/patient rela-
tionship.  Extant biases in the delivery of medical care to vulner-
able populations might further skew information costs for
persons already ill-placed to acquire reliable information about
their conditions and care.  Also, there is concern that legalization
would tend to skew the cost of substitutes for PAS—for example,
that of adequate palliative care—for persons already ill placed to
pursue them.  Finally, there are serious worries about coercion
under a regime allowing for institutionalized PAS.149
There is also concern that legalization would irremediably
breach various elements of physician responsibility and the pre-
148 See Brief for Respondents, supra  note 147, at 1.
149 See  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 795 (1997).
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sumption of trust in the doctor/patient relationship.150  In social
situations where that relationship is already significantly compro-
mised, this could lead to an extremely pernicious downward spi-
ral, further compromising not just the ability of terminal patients
to make informed, autonomous choices, but also the ability of
the medical profession to deliver effective care to broader seg-
ments of vulnerable populations in diverse circumstances.151
This entails, at least, a significant spillover cost that needs to be
addressed in this debate.
Concern for the import of PAS for variously vulnerable per-
sons has been often mentioned,152 but there has nonetheless
been a dearth of in-depth analysis of this issue.  Several excep-
tions are noteworthy, but I will focus on just one.  Specifically,
I’ll look to several issues raised by Patricia King and Leslie Wolf
concerning African-American patients and PAS.153  Most gener-
ally, Professors King and Wolf express well-founded concerns
that legalization of PAS—typically advocated as critically en-
hancing patient autonomy—may actually serve as a new locus of
coercion and social pressure for already vulnerable populations.
At the outset, we might do well to note a preliminary observa-
tion made by King and Wolf, applying in this context a point
often made much more broadly in bioethics; that is, that atten-
tion to common (in statistical terms) characteristics of some mi-
nority group ought not to obscure the very real, and significant,
heterogeneity within that group, and that useful generalities
ought not to be reified into over rigid stereotypes.154  The impli-
150 See, e.g.,  Brief for the American Medical Association, et al., as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-
110).
151 A similar point has already been made with respect to the diagnosis and treat-
ment of HIV in the African-American community; that is, that public health efforts
in the African-American community have been hampered by, e.g., the legacy of Tus-
kegee and that this compromised care has had spillover effects for the broader soci-
ety in turn. See, e.g. , James H. Jones, The Tuskegee Legacy:  AIDS and the Black
Community , HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 38.
152 See  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703-04, 730, 785 (1997) (expres-
sing concern about vulnerable groups in general and for not-fully-competent pa-
tients, and raising special concern about managed care); Burt, supra  note 57. R
153 See King & Wolf, supra  note 145. R
154 See id.  at 1019.  This is an extremely general point. The authors raise it with
special concern to vulnerability to coercion in particular social contexts but it applies
equally well across the continuum from characteristics that are ideally social, to
mixed social-biological characteristics, to characteristics for which there is very
strong, heritable coding, e.g., from communication problems, to differential risk of
coronary disease, to risk of sickle-cell expression.
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cation noted by the authors is that we need to develop “thick
descriptions”—detailed, complex, individual descriptions—of pa-
tients to understand whether or to what extent they are vulnera-
ble.155  Failure to develop such descriptions can have disastrous
consequences in the delivery of care to individual patients.  And
that is doubly problematic, given the general worries we have
raised regarding difficult-to-detect, and difficult-to-assess, cogni-
tive impairment among the more general population of elderly,
terminal patients.156
Bracketing the importance of individual assessment, there are
several general observations of note.  First, African-American
patients are more likely than whites to express distrust of the
medical establishment generally, and are, in particular, less likely
than whites to support the legalization of PAS.157  Second, Afri-
can-American distrust of the medical establishment may be well-
founded, as it rests on a long history of mistreatment, which has
run the gamut from benign neglect to exploitation and outright
abuse.158  Indeed, abusive treatment includes not just the afore-
mentioned nineteenth century victimization of slaves, but recent
and well-publicized activities.  Probably most famous of these is
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, which the Public Health Service ex-
tended into the 1970s (and might well have extended rather
longer if not for considerable external pressure to abandon it);
that is, long past the Nazi War Crimes Trials and the adoption of
the Nuremberg Code, long past the Declaration of Helsinki, and
indeed some years past the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.159  And the Tuskegee Study was not the final scandal in
155 Id . at 1020.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 104-26.
157 See Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Race, Ethnicity, and the Health Care System:
Public Perceptions and Experiences , 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 218, 233 (Supp. 1
2000) (reporting that minority Americans generally, and African-Americans in par-
ticular, are more distrustful of the medical profession than whites); see also  Annette
Dula, African-American Suspicion of the Healthcare System is Justified:  What Do We
Do About It? , 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 347 (1994); King & Wolf,
supra  note 145, at 1022-23 (citing, among other sources, P.V. Caralis et al., The In- R
fluence of Ethnicity and Race on Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, Life-Prolong-
ing Treatments, and Euthanasia , 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 155 (1993); Richard L.
Lichtenstein et al., Black/White Differences in Attitudes Toward Physician-Assisted
Suicide , 89 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 125 (1997)).
158 See  King & Wolf, supra  note 145, at 1023. R
159 See JONES, supra note 141 (describing the several decades of comprehensive R
subject abuse in the study that examined untreated syphilis in African-American
males exclusively); Jones, supra note 151 (addressing some of Tuskegee’s epistemic R
legacy in the African American Community).
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that ongoing history.160  Leaving aside such stark cases of abuse,
we note that the African-American community continues to suf-
fer disparate—and disadvantaged—access to health care in sev-
eral significant areas.161  For example, African-Americans are
less likely than white Americans to receive pharmacological ther-
apy, diagnostic angiography and catheterization, and invasive
surgical treatment for heart disease and stroke;162 and African-
Americans suffer disparate health outcomes, having higher death
rates from coronary disease, breast cancer, colon cancer, diabe-
160 See  King & Wolf, supra  note 145, at 1029 (citing Charles Marwick, Questions R
Raised About Measles Vaccine Trial , 276 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1288 (1996)).
161 See, e.g. , Mayberry et al., supra  note 143 (conducting a broad review of the R
health services literature since 1984 and reporting persistent disparities even after
adjusting for socioeconomic status, insurance coverage, stage or severity of disease,
comorbidities, type and availability of health care services and patient preference).
Establishing disparate access and disparate outcomes according to race raises com-
plex methodological issues well beyond the scope of this Article.  Following May-
berry et al., I want to suggest that the findings of disparate access (and outcomes)
are—at least in certain health areas—robust across diverse study populations and
statistical methods.  And although it is important to tease out those disparities that
may be diminished adjusting for, e.g., income, education, or insurance status, we
should not be too quick to dismiss the race problem as a specious correlation in
those instances where, e.g., income effects appear to dominate, especially as race is
not irrelevant to determining income.  It should be noted that differential access has
not been observed in all areas of health care.  For example, several studies of access
to medical care for diabetes have found no significant racial differences.  Mayberry
et al., supra  note 143, at 123 (citing, e.g., C.C. Cowie and M.I. Harris, Ambulatory R
Medical Care for Non-Hispanic Whites, African-Americans, and Mexican-Americans
with NiDDM in the U.S. , 20 DIABETES CARE 142 (1997)).  For a discussion of the
underlying causes of differential health outcomes, with at least one aspect of access
(consistent coverage due to membership in a single HMO) held constant, compare
Anthony S. Robbins et al., Race, Prostate Cancer Survival, and Membership in a
Large Health Maintenance Organization , 90 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 986 (1998), and
Anthony S. Robbins et al., Response , 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 802 (1999), with
Mack Roach III et al., Re:  Race, Prostate Cancer Survival, and Membership in a
Large Health Maintenance Organization , 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 801 (1999).
162 Mayberry et al., supra  note 143, at 113; John G. Canto et al., Relation of Race
and Sex to the Use of Reperfusion Therapy in Medicare Beneficiaries with Acute My-
ocardial Infarction , 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1094 (2000).  Disparities in access to
coronary care are especially significant as coronary artery disease is the leading
cause of death in the United States.  Lynne C. Einbinder & Kevin A. Schulman, The
Effect of Race on the Referral Process for Invasive Cardiac Procedures , 57 MED.
CARE RES. & REV. 162, 162 (2000 Supp. 1).  At least with access to coronary-revas-
cularization procedures, it does not appear that we can attribute disparate access to
over-use by whites. See Eric D. Peterson et al., Racial Variation in the Use of Coro-
nary-Revascularization Procedures , 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480, 480 (1997) (“The
differences in treatment were most pronounced among those predicted to benefit
most from revascularization.  Since these differences also correlated with a lower
survival rate in blacks, we conclude that coronary revascularization appears to be
underused in blacks.”).
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tes, and suffering from higher infant mortality.163  Third, in part
because of this history, in part because of frequent social and
economic differences between medical professionals and Afri-
can-American patients, and in part because of the various grada-
tions of racism, communication problems between medical
professionals and their African-American patients are common
and can be quite serious.164
The communication problem is of special significance for our
discussion, as it bears both on the particular concerns of African-
Americans and on some of our most general concerns about
PAS.  Consider a cascade that miscommunication and mistrust
might engender.  African-American patients—as a group—may
tend to downplay or fail to discuss their pain symptoms with phy-
sicians.165  When they do discuss these symptoms, they may have
their subjective reports of pain significantly downgraded by their
caregivers.166  Thus, reports of pain symptoms by African-Ameri-
can patients may be biased at both ends of the clinical encounter:
Patients themselves may artificially depress both the frequency
and urgency of their reporting while physicians—typically uncon-
sciously—downgrade those reports further, reducing the magni-
tude of pain reports more than race-neutral error rates would
suggest.167  Moreover, such biases with respect to pain symptoms
need to be considered against the backdrop of a general medical
163 See, e.g. , James J. Dignam et al., Outcomes Among African-Americans and
Caucasians in Colon Cancer Adjuvant Therapy Trials:  Findings From the National
Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project , 91 J. NATL. CANCER INST. 1933 (1999)
(reporting lower survival rates from colon cancer for African-Americans generally,
as well as the fact that the disparity may be diminished through early detection and
adjuvant therapy); Robin M. Weinick et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Access
to and Use of Health Care Services, 1977-1996 , 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 36, 37
(2000 Supp. 1);
164 See, e.g. , Cindy Brach & Irene Fraserirector, Can Cultural Competency Reduce
Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities? A Review and Conceptual Model , 57 MED.
CARE RES. & REV. 181 (2000 Supp. 1); Einbinder & Schulman, supra  note 162, at R
168 (citing fear as the major legacy of Tuskegee).
165 James M. Raczynski et al., Diagnoses, Symptoms, and Attribution of Symptoms
Among Black and White Inpatients Admitted for Coronary Heart Disease , 84 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 951 (1994).
166 See  King & Wolf, supra  note 145, at 1039 (citing Herbert Nickens, The Gen- R
ome Project and Health Services for Minority Populations , in THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 58, 65 (Thomas H. Murray et al. eds.,
1996) (reporting his impression of disparate pain relief treatment for African-Amer-
icans and whites); Vanessa Northington Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee:
African Americans and Health Care , 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1774 (1997) (re-
porting an anecdotal illustration of such disparate treatment)).
167 At one end of the spectrum, such recalibration of patient complaints can lead
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tendency to under-treat pain symptoms in terminal patients.168
Straightforwardly, under-representation of pain symptoms can
lead to under-medication of pain symptoms.  And under-medica-
tion of pain symptoms can promote or aggravate depression in
the terminal elderly, and can otherwise prompt requests for PAS,
requests that often disappear in the face of adequate pain
medication.169
Such miscommunication and mistrust might prompt clinical er-
rors in a variety of settings.  But they may cause special—and
especially hard to detect and document—problems in end-of-life
care.  Medical decisions at the end of life are, typically, acute ver-
sions of complex decision-making under uncertainty.  These are
frequently decisions that depend on hard-to-manage information
about myriad technical and biomedical phenomena.  Moreover,
to the extent that relevant information is specialized to a given
patient’s complex disease state (and health history), sources of
information independent from a given context of care may be
either nonexistent or isolated from the patient by physical and
social barriers, the removal of which may be impossibly costly.170
It is not clear that such decisions can be made consensually ab-
sent ongoing, effective patient/physician dialogue.171  But here
we have described both a significant lever for increased demand
for PAS (if not outright coercion) within a suspect class and a
to the outright dismissal of bona fide symptom reports and hence the failure to ex-
plore the underlying causes of those symptoms.
168 See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, supra  note 35; see R
also  Cleeland et al., supra  note 35 (reporting that forty-two percent of its sample of R
597 cancer patients were not given adequate analgesic therapy).
169 See GERT ET AL., supra  note 44, at 280. R
170 See  Arrow, supra  note 8, at 965-66. R
171 In that respect, the disparate access to invasive cardiac procedures may be
especially telling.  The referral process for invasive cardiac procedures is similarly
complex to end-of-life decision-making, implicating both objective and subjective
symptom assessment, patient and physician values, and complex patient/physician
dialogue.  Lynne C. Einbinder and Kevin A. Schulman have broken down the pro-
cess of obtaining invasive cardiac care into eight steps, including (1) recognition of
symptoms by the patient; (2) obtaining access to providers; (3) presentation and
recognition of symptoms; (4) physician assessment and initial recommendation; (5)
patient acceptance of physician recommendations; (6) referral for noninvasive diag-
nostic evaluation; (7) referral for cardiac catheterization; and (8) referral for coro-
nary angioplasty.  Einbinder & Schulman, supra  note 162, at 164 fig. 1.  They
conclude that “[r]ace can effect each of the steps in the referral process for invasive
cardiac procedures.”  Taking this referral process as a model for the potential pitfalls
surrounding end-of-life decision-making should give further pause about the impact
of PAS for the African-American community.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 45  5-MAY-05 12:04
Thou Shalt Not Kill 1283
significant barrier to the sort of dialogue that might mitigate such
demand and that is, not incidentally, necessary to proper consent.
Of course, even the most ardent advocates of PAS do not ar-
gue that physicians should legally (or otherwise) be allowed to
accede to requests for assisted suicide when more traditional
treatment modalities would obviate the need for such requests;
that is, when the requests are borne solely, or even substantially,
of inadequate delivery of available and presently lawful medical
care.  That would indeed be inexpensive, and in some crude
sense cost-justified, but neither Posner nor any other serious ad-
vocate of PAS sees that substitution as framing a desirable policy
initiative.  But here we have described a social situation in which
such requests are liable to be numerous, and where complex so-
cial and historical factors stand in the way of parsing those re-
quests from bona fide  requests for PAS.
Such problems require nothing like conscious or intentional ra-
cism.  Notice, too, that the deepest sort of failure that might oc-
cur here hinges on aspects of medical care unlikely to be
revealed in standard quality-of-care metrics, as these are typically
narrow and outcome-based.172  And where the upshot of various
interactive failures is an unwanted and unnecessary death, it is
not clear how standard morbidity and mortality review could cat-
egorically identify bad outcomes—as opposed to the most grossly
deficient processes—after the fact; once we identify assisted sui-
cide as a legitimate procedure, we create a category of therapy
for which death is not necessarily—or even typically—a “bad
outcome” subject to clinical scrutiny or blame.173
As for process, consider the extent to which full and effective
informed consent—problematic even in ideal practice situations,
if an acknowledged benchmark of every serious brief for legal-
ized PAS—is fundamentally compromised by such gaping fail-
ures of communication.  Of course, not every doctor/patient
172 See generally MARK B. MCCLELLAN & DOUGLAS STAIGER, THE QUALITY OF
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 7327,
1999) (offering a multi-dimensional, outcome-based quality-of-care assessment
method and critiquing alternatives), at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=196391. It is not that outcome-based metrics are liable to miss
disparate health outcomes in minority communities altogether.  It is rather that they
are unlikely to be sensitive to the sorts of communication failures at issue here,
lumping them together with other demographic disadvantages rather than highlight-
ing them.
173 Similarly, Posner himself highlights the difficulty of identifying Dutch euthana-
sia cases, given their clinical taxonomy. See POSNER, supra  note 10, at 252-53. R
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encounter will exhibit such failures when the patient is African-
American.  And this is so quite independent of the identity of the
physician.  But we cannot be sanguine about giving license to
PAS where such breakdowns are liable to be common.  As the
Court has said, “death is different.”174  And just as special consti-
tutional concerns are implicated wherever the State wants to take
a life,175 and especially where such decisions impact differentially
on members of “suspect classes,” so we are at least politically
bound to subject to special scrutiny any practice whereby the
State would provide legal sanction—and indeed likely direct or
indirect funding—for the “private” taking of lives, where such
practices may impact differentially on members of suspect
classes.
How do we tally the costs and benefits of Posner’s putative
policy initiative at this stage?  The answer is unclear.  We do
know that Posner gave short shrift to the problem of verified,
volitional election of PAS, despite the overwhelming evidence of
cognition-related difficulties for the largest likely candidate pop-
ulation.  A fair accounting would consider at least two additional
sorts of costs: those imposed in revising Posner’s very obviously
inadequate psychological screening procedures and those im-
posed by the errors that any such revision would inevitably fail to
avoid.  Questions regarding those two sorts of costs are not unre-
lated, for questions about the efficiency of any particular screen-
ing procedure are, in part, questions about the costs of any given
error rate.  Moreover, I have suggested that the cost of error is
confounded in that interpersonal valuations of human lives are
inherently problematic, especially when we seek to balance lives
lost versus persons killed.  When we consider PAS and the Afri-
can-American population the calculus is further confounded.
For there, we need to account for, among other things, what is
liable to be a higher error rate.  And we need to account for both
first- and third-person costs, both ex ante  and ex post .
There is an open and essentially unanalyzed question of how
we might possibly fix the scope of third-party effects here.  If we
recall a broader distrust of the medical profession within the Af-
rican-American community than in the population at large, and if
we recall the broader range of public health problems conceiva-
bly implicated by that differential mistrust, then we might well
174 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
175 See id. ; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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wonder how to cabin the third-party costs—say, in terms of pub-
lic health effects alone—of a largely unwanted legalization of
PAS?
The point of all this is not to claim any particular cost to PAS.
It is, rather, to highlight (1) that the costs of PAS would inevita-
bly be greater than Posner has let on; and (2) that the job of
counting—or even constraining the domain of significant factors
to be counted—would inevitably be far more complicated than
Posner suggests.  That is simply to say that Posner’s apparently
flawed balancing of costs and benefits raises interesting questions
about whether a defensible, rigorous accounting of costs and
benefits could be forthcoming.
CONCLUSION:  EMBEDDED NORMS AND TRANSACTION COSTS
Posner’s analysis of PAS is in some ways fascinating.  At the
same time, it suffers from serious flaws.  I have argued that his
account suffers from both substantive and methodological
problems.  I have argued that some of the methodological
problems may be intractable and that they suggest a special prob-
lem with certain assumptions underlying risk management and
the valuation of life as it is sometimes practiced in the agencies.
There remains the nontrivial normative question: what to do?
The answer, in briefest form, is nothing.  I believe that we
ought to be chary of proposals to legalize PAS in additional
states.  Perhaps it goes without saying that we ought to avoid
such a move in federal law.  Given the current institutional
framework in which medicine (and public health) is practiced, I
believe that further legalization of PAS would be a mistake.  De-
spite the copious academic literature on the subject and the
plaintiffs’ briefs—and amicus briefs—in the Glucksberg  and
Quill  cases, I have seen no convincing case that accounts for the
salient costs, as well as the putative benefits, of legally sanctioned
PAS.  For all its interest, I do not see that Posner’s analysis has
fundamentally altered the landscape.  My position is, of course,
suggested by my more substantive critique of Posner’s account.
There, I have argued that Posner greatly underestimated the
costs associated with legal sanction for PAS.  The informal impli-
cations are that those costs are great and we ought to avoid im-
plementing Posner’s proposal or generalizing the initiatives of
the Oregon legislature.
Behind this position is the question of what sort of explanation
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might be adequate; and the answer is not entirely clear.  I have
already suggested that implicit in the PAS debate are questions
about risk management that are difficult in general and especially
problematic when applied to consent issues for likely candidates
for PAS.  Moreover, I think that most extant arguments for legal-
ization share with Posner’s analysis an under-appreciation for the
sort of sea change in moral norms that legalization would entail.
This limitation applies equally to our most general moral norms
against intentional killing and some of the difficult implementa-
tions of those norms we see embedded in contemporary medical
practice as it deals with difficult questions about treatment at the
end of life.  In brief, I see inadequate attention paid to the likely
high transaction costs entailed by any attempt to remake such
norms via legislative fiat.
As mirror to the old and indecisive argument over the effi-
ciency of the common law is a newer argument regarding the effi-
ciency of social norms.  Robert Ellickson, for example, has
suggested that at least certain sorts of norms may tend to maxi-
mize social welfare, whereas Eric Posner has argued that norms
are often likely to be “‘inefficient,’” at least in a sense.176  At the
same time, Eric Posner has recognized the difficulty of answering
the question whether norms are efficient (as well as the difficulty
of reforming those which may not be so).177
I have no general theory regarding the efficiency of social
norms.  Conspicuous here, however, is that the PAS debate im-
plicates distinctive sorts of norms, including some of our most
generally held—if not wholly universal—principles regarding the
value of human life and the necessary prerequisites to the taking
of human life.  Moreover, we deal here not with social norms
that—in Ellickson’s sense—float above law’s more formal social
constraints.178  Rather, we have a debate over the proper bound-
ary conditions of these norms and the way that they are rein-
forced in the law.  Even in this restricted domain, real
optimization arguments are liable to be problematic—either too
thin to be much more than question begging or too baroque to be
significantly general.  Still, I think it plain enough that we have
good preliminary grounds for favoring these norms over many
176 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); cf . Eric A. Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1996).
177 See  Posner, supra note 176, at 1705; POSNER, supra  note 62, at 8 (regarding the R
difficulty of tuning or reforming such norms).
178 See ELLICKSON, supra  note 176, at 123-36. R
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alternatives, and equally good grounds to set a rather high
threshold of proof for candidate replacements.  To return to
Judge Posner’s source, John Stuart Mill, we have “the whole past
duration of the human species” to consult regarding the implica-
tions of various moral rules.179  If that history provides something
less than a definitive proof of welfare maximization, it provides
nonetheless strong pre-theoretical grounds for caution in public
rewriting of the sorts of standards at issue in the PAS debate.  My
suggestion is this:  to first approximation, that subset of social
norms consisting of fundamental moral rules represents an ex-
tremely useful set of heuristics for maximizing social welfare.  As
such, the criteria for the defeasibility of such norms—the
grounds on which we might reasonably consider suspending or
revising them—ought to be especially demanding.
We have a deeply entrenched and nearly universal norm
against intentional killing.180  In typical implementations, the
norm is defeasible; that is, it is suspended in certain, limited con-
texts.181  Suppose we think of that norm as a defeasible heuristic
(at the most general level this is consistent with both sides of the
act/rule divide in utilitarianism).182  That is, suppose—as I think
plausible—that our most general rule against intentional killing
tends towards maximizing social welfare but cannot, in universal
application, guarantee it.  To unpack the assumption:
1.  The rule is indeed a very good rule of thumb;
2.  The rule tends to promote the social welfare in its fre-
quency of observation or application; and
3.  The rule tends to promote the social welfare in its public
aspects, in being predictable in both projection and applica-
tion (clear, systematic, and forceful).
As corollary to these assumptions I offer:
Conditions for suspending the rule—or redrawing its scope—
ought to be both formally and substantively demanding.183
179 See JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism , in  UTILITARIANISM WITH CRITICAL
ESSAYS, 28-29 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971).
180 See BERNARD GERT, MORALITY 67-70 (1988).
181 See, e.g. , Carlos Iván Chesñevar et al., Logical Models of Argument , 32 ACM
COMPUTING SURVEYS 337 (2000) (regarding defeasible logics generally).
182 See, e.g. , Allen Newell & Herbert A. Simon, Computer Science as Empirical
Inquiry:  Symbols and Search , 19 COMM. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY 113 (1976)
(discussing heuristic search generally).
183 Whether one takes this corollary as a first- or second-order principle (or both)
may hang on commitments to particular systematic approaches to morality I would
hope to leave aside for purposes of this discussion.  That is, the commitment to set-
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In their deservedly famous Turing Award lecture of 1975, Her-
bert A. Simon and Allen Newell described heuristic search
thusly: “The solutions to problems are represented as symbol
structures.  A physical symbol system exercises its intelligence in
problem-solving by search—that is, by generating and progres-
sively modifying symbol structures until it produces a solution
structure.”184  For our purposes, two features of heuristic search
are especially salient.  First, Newell and Simon intended that in-
telligent search models meet a “strong” limitation criterion; that
is, they need to recognize the bounds of limited processing re-
sources in not just a logical or mathematical sense but in a “prac-
tical” one.185  Second, they saw the difficulty of a problem (and
“intelligence” or utility of a method of solution) as resting not so
much in the complexity of search involved but in the amount of
search that “would  be required if a requisite level of intelligence
were not applied.”186
Our conservative fallback to the familiar, if difficult, standards
regarding end-of-life problems surely fulfills the practicality re-
quirement proposed: compared to an unbounded social welfare
analysis—much less an undeveloped cost-benefit analysis—the
prohibition against PAS as a form of killing is at least  tractable.
Adopting our corollary above adds the further benefit of radi-
cally reducing the search: to the extent that the rule tends  toward
beneficial outcomes, it should be treated as an embedded rule—
one defeasible only under very limited and carefully specified cir-
cumstances.  To the extent that the rule is thus treated as an em-
bedded rule, further evaluation and search are simply suspended
in the typical case.  That is, a second heuristic (roughly: stop
looking) operates at the evaluation and search stages following
the first heuristic (just follow the rule), which governs the symbol
(solution) generation heuristic.  This is a ubiquitous, if trivial,
bounded search strategy.
My position regarding Posner’s under-accounting of the trans-
action costs in a change in legal regimes thus depends on a de-
scriptive observation and a normative suggestion.  The
ting the bar high may be seen either as a principle governing an individual’s adher-
ence to the more general rule in a particular case or as a principle governing the
reform or qualification of that rule more generally.
184 Newell & Simon, supra  note 182, at 120. R
185 See id.
186 Id . at 122.  Hence their notion of “intelligence without much search.” Id . at
124.
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descriptive observation is that the relevant norms are in fact
deeply embedded in the practice of medicine and in our larger
society.  Changing them is thus liable to be expensive because, in
addition to the usual transaction costs associated with changes in
legal rules, implementation of the change is liable to be espe-
cially difficult even as the consequences of such changes may be
especially hard to predict.187  My normative suggestion is that
this heightened degree of entrenchment of the norms in question
is very likely a good thing: Prima facie , we ought  to respect the
entrenchment and utility of the norm itself, and thus any efforts
to affect the operation of the norm via the legal system ought to
be efforts to shore it up rather than tear it down.  My suggestion
has both a substantive and an epistemic component: justifying a
legal attempt to modify the norm requires a significant (as op-
posed to marginal) improvement in social welfare and our confi-
dence in the prediction of that margin needs to be
correspondingly high.  Observing that no one has met this bur-
den is thus a positive argument, not a negative one: the right
thing to do socially is to maintain the heuristic and the present
legal regime; the right thing to do personally is to refrain from
killing.
187 Indeed, to some extent, because  the results will be difficult to predict.
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